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I. Introduction
There	are	two	interestingly	similar	but	also	notably	different	theories	
that	go	under	the	moniker	 ‘expressivism’.	Each	kind	of	expressivism	
has	a	crude	original	form	that	has	been	supplanted	by	more	and	more	
sophisticated	 versions.	 In	 their	 crude	 forms,	 the	 theories	 are	 strik-
ingly	similar,	whereas	in	their	sophisticated	forms	they	are	strikingly	
dissimilar.	
Ethical expressivism	 is,	 at	 least	 originally,	 the	 view	 that	 ordinary	
ethical	statements	—	such	as	statements	about	what	is	ethically	right	
or	wrong1	—	express	not	beliefs	but	some	pro-	or	con-attitudes.2	The	
1.	 A	point	of	terminology	that	will	become	clearer	as	we	move	along:	unfortu-
nately	 there	 is	no	uniform	usage	of	 the	terms	 ‘statement’	and	 ‘sentence’	 in	
ordinary	 discourse	 or	 in	 the	metaethical	 literature.	 A	 rough	way	 to	 distin-
guish	these	terms	that	I	think	good	enough	for	present	purposes	is	as	follows:	
a	 statement	 is	 a	 speech-act	 that	 involves	 the	 tokening	 of	 an	 unembedded	
declarative	sentence;	a	sentence	is	an	abstract	form	of	words,	which	obeys	
syntax	rules	and	has	semantic	value	recursively	explicable	in	terms	of	the	se-
mantic	values	and	concatenations	of	its	parts.	When	one	makes	a	statement,	
we	can	say	that	one	has	produced	a	token	of	a	declarative	sentence.	In	light	
of	this	distinction,	we	can	say	that	semantics	attempts	to	explain	the	semantic	
value	of	sentences	and	their	parts,	while	pragmatics	attempts	to	explain	the	
norms	of	proper	use	of	sentences	and	their	parts	to	perform	speech-acts	like	
making	 statements.	 The	 interaction	 between	 these	 is	 notoriously	 complex	
and	controversial.	Moreover,	much	of	what	can	be	said	about	statements	can	
also	be	said	about	their	mental	analogs.	However,	I	won’t	go	into	either	of	
these	 issues	 here.	 I’ll	 also	 leave	 it	 vague	 how	 far	 the	 class	 of	 ethical	 state-
ments/sentences	 extends.	 If	 everything	 I	 say	 about	 ethical	 statements/sen-
tences	were	true	only	of	statements/sentences	about	what	is	ethically	right	
or	wrong,	that	would	still	be	significant.
2.	 Original	 defenders	 include	 Ayer	 (1936)	 and	 Stevenson	 (1937).	 It’s	 worth	
noting	 that	ethical	expressivism	 is	 sometimes	 interpreted	as	a	claim	about	
the	meaning	of	ethical	words	and	the	sentences	 in	which	they	figure.	(See,	
for	 instance,	Schroeder	 [2008],	whose	 subtitle	 is	 “Evaluating	 the	Semantic	
Program	of	Expressivism”.)	However,	for	both	Ayer	and	Stevenson,	their	ver-
sions	of	expressivism	are	views	about	the	meaning	of	ethical	words	only	in	
a	very	attenuated	sense	of	‘meaning’.	In	any	case,	as	I	am	understanding	the	
position,	it	is	not	directly	a	claim	about	semantic	value	of	ethical	words	and	
sentences	 (i. e.,	 it	would	 require	 further	general	 assumptions	 about	 the	na-
ture	of	semantic	values	before	expressivism,	as	I	understand	it,	would	entail	
a	claim	about	semantic	value).	But,	in	my	view,	this	doesn’t	affect	the	main	
sorts	of	advantages	that	ethical	expressivists	typically	claim.	
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themselves	which	then	explain	the	attending	motivations.	More	gen-
erally,	 the	attraction	of	 this	sort	of	view	 is	 that	one	can	 treat	ethical	
discourse	as	legitimate	without	committing	to	a	range	of	ethical	facts	
or	to	a	special	psychological	link	between	ethical	beliefs	and	motiva-
tions	to	act.	In	this	way,	ethical	expressivism	is	supposed	to	have	the	
advantages	of	both	ontological	and	psychological	parsimony	over	its	
realist	rivals.
Avowal expressivism (to	 coin	 a	 new	 name	 for	 an	 old	 view)	 is,	 at	
least	 originally,	 the	 view	 that	 ordinary	 first-personal	 present-tense	
ascriptions	 of	 mental	 states	—	avowals	 like	 “I	 want	 tea”	 or	 “I	 love	
you”	—	express	not	self-ascriptive	beliefs	but	the	very	mental	state	they	
avow	—	e. g.,	a	desire	for	tea	or	love	for	one’s	addressee.3	The	primary	
motivation	 for	 this	 view	 stems	 from	 certain	 asymmetries	 between	
avowals	 and	 other	 statements	 of	 contingent	 fact.	On	 the	 one	 hand,	
avowals	seem	to	be	pronouncements	on	an	ordinary	contingent	mat-
ter	of	(mental)	fact,	but	on	the	other	hand,	it	would	ordinarily	be	quite	
strange	to	challenge	someone’s	avowal	unless	you	thought	that	they	
were	being	insincere.	Moreover,	this	presumptive	authority	carried	by	
avowals	is	restricted	to	the	first-personal	case;	when	pronouncing	on	
the	mental	states	of	others,	the	typical	challenges	regarding	statements	
of	contingent	matters	of	fact	are	all	available	and	not	at	all	strange.	
The	idea	is	not	that	it’s	impossible	to	challenge	avowals.	Rather,	it’s	
that	it	is	not	possible	to	challenge	them	without	violating	one	of	the	
norms	 that	normally	 attends	 to	 the	practice	of	 giving	and	 receiving	
avowals.	Perhaps,	sometimes	there	are	good	reasons	to	violate	such	
norms;	and	perhaps	some	cases	that	superficially	look	like	violations	
of	 these	norms	are	not	actually	cases	of	avowing.	An	important	spe-
cial	case	 is	when	one	avows	a	so-called	“motivated	attitude”.	This	 is	
3.	 This	position	is	typically	traced	back	to	a	suggestive	passage	in	Wittgenstein	
(1953,	p.	89);	see	also	Ginet	(1968)	for	a	more	explicit	early	statement.	The	
qualification	“ordinary”	in	the	statement	of	the	view	is	important.	There	are	
unordinary	first-personal	present-tense	ascriptions	of	mental	states	to	which	
the	view	doesn’t	apply.	For	example,	such	ascriptions	reached	 in	 the	 thera-
peutic	context	or	by	some	behavioral	analysis	will	simply	not	count	as	avow-
als,	because	they	don’t	exhibit	the	distinctive	features	of	avowals	that	require	
explanation.
motivation	 for	 this	 view	 stems	 from	 certain	 asymmetries	 between	
ethical	statements	and	other	statements.	Not	to	put	too	fine	of	a	point	
on	it,	many	philosophers	have	thought	that	the	ontological	status	of	
putative	ethical	facts	is	questionable	and	that	ethical	statements	bear	
a	distinctive	connection	to	motivation.	In	light	of	this,	the	two	primary	
advantages	usually	claimed	for	the	view	are	(i)	the	ontologically	par-
simonious	way	in	which	it	can	construe	ethical	discourse	as	nonerro-
neous,	and	(ii)	the	psychologically	parsimonious	way	in	which	it	can	
explain	the	apparently	tight	connection	between	sincere	ethical	state-
ments	and	being	motivated	to	act	in	certain	ways.	
One	can	discern	the	nature	of	these	putative	advantages	most	eas-
ily	 by	 considering	 the	 contrasting	 view	 of	 ethical	 discourse,	 which	
construes	ethical	statements	as	on	a	par	with	descriptive	statements	
in	that	they	express	beliefs,	which,	as	such,	seek	to	represent	the	facts.	
Unless	one	thinks	ethical	discourse	is	wildly	erroneous,	this	then	im-
plies	 a	 realist	 view,	 according	 to	which	 our	 ethical	 statements	 com-
mit	us	to	the	existence	of	ethical	facts.	And,	on	such	an	account,	the	
apparently	 tight	 connection	between	sincere	ethical	 statements	and	
dispositions	to	act	will	be	explained	by	positing	some	special	psycho-
logical	link	that	connects	beliefs	in	this	sort	of	fact,	but	not	beliefs	in	
most	other	sorts	of	fact,	with	motivations	to	act.	Perhaps	there	is	a	tacit	
standing	desire	in	most	humans	to	act	in	ways	they	believe	to	be	moral,	
or	perhaps	ethical	beliefs	are	beliefs	of	a	special	sort,	distinguished	by	
their	distinctive	motivational	capacities.
So,	when	the	expressivist	construes	ethical	statements	not	as	the	
expression	of	beliefs	but	as	 the	direct	expression	of	motivational	at-
titudes,	he	does	so	in	order	to	gain	a	way	of	 interpreting	ethical	dis-
course	 as	 legitimate	 although	not	 ontologically	 committing,	 and	he	
also	wants	a	very	direct	way	of	 explaining	 the	apparently	 tight	 con-
nection	between	sincere	ethical	statements	and	motivation	to	act	 in	
certain	ways.	The	idea	is	that	by	treating	statements	such	as	‘Torture	is	
wrong’	as	the	direct	expression	of	a	pro-	or	con-attitude,	we	can	allow	
that	one	can	make	or	endorse	ethical	statements	without	committing	
oneself	to	the	obtaining	of	ethical	facts;	and	it’s	the	expressed	attitudes	
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introspectionist	view	of	avowals,	the	distinctively	first-personal	nature	
of	avowals’	authority	will	be	explained	by	something	about	the	nature	
of	introspection	that	makes	it	impossible	to	use	introspection	to	form	
beliefs	 about	 other	 people’s	mental	 states.	 Introspectionism	 thus	 in-
volves	a	cognitive	commitment	and	an	epistemological	commitment.	
The	cognitive	commitment	is	to	the	existence	of	a	faculty	or	method	of	
introspection.	The	epistemological	commitment	is	to	the	idea	that	the	
explanation	for	the	distinctive	epistemological	security	of	avowals	is	
that	they	are	the	expressions	of	beliefs	reached	by	this	special	faculty	
or	method.
So,	 when	 the	 expressivist	 construes	 avowals	 as	 expressing	 the	
avowed	mental	states	rather	than	beliefs	about	these	states,	she	does	
so	in	order	to	gain	an	explanatiion	of	the	typical	unchallenageability	
and	first-personal	authority	of	avowals,	an	explanation	that	avoids	the	
cognitive	and	epistemic	commitments	by	not	appealing	to	any	special	
faculty	or	method	of	introspection.	The	idea	is	to	treat	avowals	such	as	
(the	ordinary	uses	of)	“I	want	tea”	or	“I	love	you”	as	the	expression	of	
desire	for	tea	or	love	for	the	addressee	rather	than	as	the	expression	
of	a	belief	about	one’s	own	mental	states.	These	expressions	and	our	
ability	 to	make	 them	are	 like	other	expressions	of	desires,	 love,	 etc., 
and	our	ability	to	make	them.	We	humans	seem	to	be	endowed	with	
a	quite	general	ability	to	express	our	minds	by	doing	things	like	winc-
ing,	crying,	and	giving	a	thumbs-up,	but	also	by	avowing.5	It	doesn’t	
typically	make	sense	to	ask	for	the	justification	of	the	former	sorts	of	
expression,	and	this,	the	avowal	expressivist	thinks,	also	explains	the	
unchallengeability	of	avowal.	Moreover,	although	we	can	easily	claim	
faculty	or	method	for	generating	typically	unchallengeable	beliefs	about	our	
own	mental	states	that	are	then	expressed	by	avowals.	Because	of	this,	it’s	not	
only	someone	like	Descartes	or	Locke	who	counts	as	an	introspectionist	in	
my	sense	but	also	more	contemporary	philosophers	such	as	Chisholm	(1981),	
Davidson	(1984,	1987),	Burge	(1988),	Peacocke	(1998),	Bilgrami	(1998),	and	
Moran	(2001).
5.	 Despite	 the	broad	way	 I	 think	we	should	understand	 introspectionism,	 it’s	
implausible	to	think	that	the	general	ability	to	express	our	minds	should	be	
thought	of	as	 the	 faculty	of	 introspection.	For	we	share	 this	general	ability	
with	other	organisms	to	which	it	is	implausible	to	attribute	self-beliefs.
a	mental	state	for	which	one	can	have	good	or	bad	reasons,	such	as	
a	belief.	 In	 cases	 like	 these,	where	one	says,	 for	example,	 “I	believe	
the	President	is	guilty	of	treason,”	we	can	of	course	challenge	the	be-
lief	avowed	by	saying	something	like	“That’s	not	right:	the	President	
hasn’t	 done	 what	 you	 think	 he	 has	 done.”	 What	 remains	 typically	
unchallengeable	 is	 the	avowal	 itself.	To	challenge	this,	we’d	have	to	
say	 instead	something	 like	“I	 think	you’re	mistaken	about	your	own	
beliefs;	surely	you	don’t	really	believe	that	the	President	would	com-
mit	treason.”	There	may	be	cases	where	such	a	challenge	is	legitimate,	
but	normally	it	isn’t,	which	marks	a	curious	asymmetry	to	most	other	
statements	of	contingent	fact.
In	 light	 of	 this	 asymmetry,	 the	 two	 primary	 advantages	 usually	
claimed	for	avowal	expressivism	are	(i)	the	epistemologically	parsimo-
nious	way	in	which	it	can	explain	why,	in	ordinary	discourse,	avowals	
are	 typically	 unchallengeable,	 and	 (ii)	 the	 cognitively	 parsimonious	
way	 in	which	 it	can	explain	 the	distinctively	first-personal	nature	of	
avowals’	authority.
Again,	the	nature	of	these	putative	advantages	is	probably	best	seen	
by	considering	the	contrasting	view	of	avowals,	which	sees	them	as	
the	expression	of	beliefs	about	the	avower’s	own	mental	states.	Unless	
one	 denies	 the	 apparent	 asymmetries	 between	 avowals	 and	 other	
statements,	one	will	tend	to	endorse	the	introspectionist	view	that	the	
beliefs	expressed	by	avowals	must	be	acquired	 in	some	special	way,	
because	they	do	not	seem	to	be	reached	by	some	especially	secure	ap-
plication	of	a	general	method	of	acquiring	knowledge	(e. g.,	empirical	
observation	or	deductive,	inductive,	or	abductive	inference).	That	is	to	
say	that	the	introspectionist	explains	the	typical	unchallengeability	of	
avowals	by	appeal	to	a	special	faculty	or	method	of	acquiring	very	reli-
able	beliefs	about	one’s	own	mental	states.	Whatever	the	exact	nature	
of	this	faculty	or	method,	they	call	it	“introspection”.4	And	so,	on	this	
4.	 Although	introspectionism	is	sometimes	characterized	as	 the	view	that	we	
have	an	“inner-eye”	by	which	we	reach	beliefs	about	our	own	mental	 lives,	
one	need	not	commit	to	the	visual	metaphor	to	be	an	introspectionist	in	the	
sense	that	the	expressivist	means	to	challenge.	The	introspectionist	idea,	as	I	
understand	it	here,	is	merely	that	we	have	a	non-empirical	and	non-inferential	
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avowals	as	ostensible	manifestations	of	knowledge	in	a	way	that	tra-
ditional	 expressivists	 cannot	 satisfactorily	 explain.	When	 Suzy	 says,	
“Torture	is	wrong,”	if	we	think	the	claim	is	correct,	sincere,	and	one	to	
which	Suzy	is	entitled,	then	it	seems	correct	to	say	that	Suzy	knows	
that	 torture	 is	wrong.	 Likewise,	when	Suzy	 says,	 “I	want	 tea,”	 if	we	
think	that	the	claim	is	correct,	sincere,	and	one	to	which	Suzy	is	en-
titled,	then	it	seems	correct	to	say	that	Suzy	knows	that	she	wants	tea.	
However,	 if	 ethical	 statements	 and	 avowals	 do	 not	 express	 beliefs	
(with	the	same	content	as	the	statement),	and	having	a	belief	that	p 
is	necessary	for	knowing	that	p,	it	seems	that	the	expressivist	cannot	
make	sense	of	such	attributions	of	ethical	knowledge	and	self-knowl-
edge	on	the	basis	of	someone’s	making	an	ethical	statement	or	avowal.	
The	objection	to	both	sorts	of	expressivism	stemming	from	this	prob-
lem	may	be	 called	 the	objection from epistemic continuity,	 since	 avow-
als	and	ethical	statements	seem	to	be	continuous	with	other	sorts	of	
(belief-expressing)	statements	 in	their	ability	to	be	counted	as	mani-
festations	of	the	speaker’s	knowledge.
Another	potential	problem	with	both	sorts	of	expressivism	comes	
from	 the	 fact	 that	 ordinary	 discourse	 treats	 ethical	 statements	 and	
avowals	 as	 truth-apt	 in	 a	 way	 that	 traditional	 expressivists	 cannot	
clearly	explain.	We	say	things	such	as	“It’s	true	that	torture	is	wrong,	
but	maybe	it	is	the	lesser	of	two	evils.”	The	same	goes	for	avowals:	We	
apply	the	truth-predicate,	saying	things	such	as	“It’s	 true	that	 I	want	
tea,	but	I	want	to	be	on	time,	too”.	This	suggests	that	ethical	statements	
and	avowals	are	truth-apt.	But	it	is	unclear	how	mere	expressions	of	
motivational	attitudes	or	underlying	avowed	mental	states	like	desires	
could	be	truth-apt.	Witness	the	fact	that	“Boo	torture!”	and	“Gimme	tea”	
are	neither	true	nor	false.	The	objection	to	both	sorts	of	expressivism	
stemming	from	this	problem	may	be	called	the	objection from semantic 
continuity,	since	avowals	and	ethical	statements	seem	to	be	continuous	
with	other	sorts	of	(belief-expressing)	statements	in	being	truth-apt.
These	objections	have	persuaded	many	that	ethical	expressivism	
and	avowal	expressivism	are	hopeless.8	However,	 the	advantages	 in	
8.	 Another	objection	that	has	been	even	more	influential	within	metaethics	is	
related	 to	but	 I	 think	distinct	 from	 the	objection	 from	semantic	 continuity.	
that	someone	else	wants	tea	or	loves	the	addressee,	etc.,	we	cannot,	it	
seems,	 literally	express	their	desire,	 love,	or	whatever,	which	means	
that	expression	of	a	mental	state	 is	distinctively	first-personal.	More	
generally,	then,	on	this	view,	the	unchallengeability	of	avowals	is	ex-
plained	by	appeal	to	a	general	feature	of	the	expression	of	underlying	
mental	states;	and	the	first-personal	authority	of	avowals	is	explained	
by	appeal	to	the	fact	that	we	can	express	only	our	own	mental	states.	
In	this	way,	avowal	expressivism	is	supposed	to	have	the	advantages	
of	 both	 epistemological	 and	 cognitive	 parsimony	 over	 its	 introspec-
tionist	rivals.6
In	both	the	ethical	case	and	the	avowal	case,	treating	the	relevant	
class	of	statements	as	expressive	of	something	other	than	beliefs	(with	
the	same	content	as	the	statement)7	is	meant	to	achieve	two	sorts	of	
explanatory	 parsimony	 over	 the	 dominant	 rival	 theory.	 This	 is	 the	
sense	 in	which	 the	views	are	 strikingly	 similar.	The	 sense	 in	which	
contemporary	versions	of	the	views	are	strikingly	dissimilar	emerges	
most	clearly	in	light	of	recent	responses	to	a	common	set	of	objections.
One	potential	problem	with	these	expressivist	views	comes	from	
the	 fact	 that	 that	 ordinary	 discourse	 treats	 ethical	 statements	 and	
6.	 That	doesn’t	mean	 that	 the	 avowal	 expressivist	 has	 to	deny	 that	 there	 is	 a	
faculty	or	method	of	 introspection.	It’s	 just	that	she	doesn’t	have	to	appeal	
to	this	faculty	or	method	in	providing	a	general	account	of	the	unchallenge-
ability	 and	 first-personal	 authority	 of	 avowals,	 which	means	 that	 she	 can	
say	 comparatively	 less	 about	 the	 nature	 and	 origin	 of	 introspection.	 Even	
Wittgenstein	may	 have	 agreed	 that	 we	 introspect,	 though	 he	 would	 have	
wanted	to	point	out	the	way	in	which	this	seems	to	be	a	distinctive	and	fairly	
rare	sort	of	mental	activity	and	not	something	implicitly	already	part	of	our	
practice	of	avowing.
7.	 The	parenthetical	qualification	is	necessary	for	two	reasons.	First,	in	the	spe-
cial	case	of	avowing	a	belief	by	stating	“I	believe	that	p”,	the	avowal	expressiv-
ist’s	position	is	that	this	expresses	the belief that p,	and	not	the	second-order	
belief	 that	 the	 speaker	 believes	 that	p.	 The	 avowal	 expressivist	 holds	 that	
avowals	express	the	underlying	mental	state	itself	rather	than	second-order	
beliefs	about	it.	Second,	there	are	some	ethical	expressivists	who	think	that	
an	 ethical	 statement	 can	 express	 a	 belief	 but	 not	 an	 ethical	 belief.	 For	 ex-
ample,	Ayer	seems	to	have	thought	that	 the	statement	“You	acted	wrongly	
in	stealing	that	money”	expresses	the	belief	that	you	stole	that	money.	And	
ecumenical	expressivists	such	as	Ridge	(2006,	2007)	think	that	ethical	claims	
express	both	beliefs	and	attitudes,	but	the	belief	has	a	nonethical	content.	I	
return	to	ecumenical	views	briefly	in	footnote	18	below.
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cross-pollination	generate	better	expressivist	positions	in	both	cases?	
As	a	subsidiary	to	my	main	thesis,	I	also	want	to	explore	this	possibil-
ity	in	§4	and	§5	below.	I	do	so	not	to	provide	a	definitive	verdict,	but	
rather	because	I	think	it	throws	into	sharp	relief	the	unorthodox	com-
mitments	one	must	adopt	 in	order	 to	gain	 the	principal	advantages	
of	each	theory.	In	the	end,	I	tentatively	suggest	that	the	commitments	
needed	 to	 make	 a	 cross-pollinated	 version	 of	 avowal	 expressivism	
work	are	much	 less	 tenable	 than	the	commitments	needed	to	make	
a	cross-pollinated	version	of	ethical	expressivism	work,	though	both	
positions	involve	significant	theoretical	costs.
II. Avowal Expressivism And Epistemic Continuity
Originally,	avowal	expressivism	was	a	deflationary	view	of	self-knowl-
edge.	Avowals	are	declarative	 in	form,	yet	 they	typically	enjoy	a	dis-
tinctive	unchallengeability.	This	unchallengeability	 leads	us	 to	 think	
that	 avowals	 are	 the	manifestations	 of	 a	 special	 kind	of	 knowledge,	
achieved	 by	 special	means:	 introspection.	 But,	 the	 deflationist	 says,	
that’s	a	bad	picture.	The	declarative	form	of	avowals	has	misled	us;	the	
typical	unchallengeability	of	avowals	is	to	be	explained	instead	in	the	
same	way	as	the	typical	unchallengeability	of	the	sorts	of	expressions	
they	can	replace,	like	“Gimme	tea”	or	a	particular	gesture.9	These	are	
direct	expressions	of	certain	mental	states,	and	it	doesn’t	make	sense	
to	 challenge	 these	expressions	 in	 the	 sense	of	 asking,	 “Really,	what	
makes	you	think	that?”	or	“What	are	your	reasons	for	thinking	that?”	
This	is	not,	according	to	early	expressivists,	because	they	are	manifes-
tations	of	a	specially	secure	sort	of	knowledge;	 it’s	because	they	are	
expressive	 rather	 than	descriptive,	and	so	 to	challenge	 them	 in	 this	
way	 involves	some	sort	of	category	mistake.	Thus,	regarding	the	ob-
jection	from	epistemic	continuity,	the	deflationist	cum	expressivist	will	
say	that	avowals	aren’t	manifestations	of	knowledge;	so	to	object	that	
they	are	is	just	to	beg	the	question	against	avowal	expressivism.
However,	most	philosophers	working	on	this	issue	now	think	such	
9.	 Many	attribute	this	position	to	Wittgenstein	(1953).	See	Ginet	(1968),	Fogelin	
(1976),	Hacker	(1993),	and	Wright	(1998).
explanatory	parsimony	gained	by	both	views	have	proven	tempting	
enough	 to	 inspire	 considerable	 theoretical	 sophistication	 in	 search	
of	plausible	defenses	of	modified	forms	of	each	kind	of	expressivism.	
Interestingly,	 these	 contemporary	 defenses	 have	 pursued	 markedly	
different	strategies	for	shoring	up	the	relevant	version	of	expressivism	
against	 the	objections.	 In	 the	 ethical	 case,	 I	 think	 the	most	worked-
out	response	comes	primarily	in	the	position	dubbed	“quasi-realism”	
by	Blackburn	(1984,	1993,	1998)	and	Gibbard	(2003),	which	seeks	to	
regain	for	expressivists	the	language	that	tempts	people	to	realism	by	
means	of	some	sort	of	minimalist	interpretation	of	the	relevant	terms	
(e. g.,	 ‘truth’,	 ‘represents’,	 ‘fact’,	 ‘belief’,	 ‘knowledge’,	 etc.).	 And	 in	 the	
avowal	case,	 I	 think	 the	most	worked-out	response	comes	primarily	
in	the	position	dubbed	“neo-expressivism”	by	Bar-On	(2004),	which	
distinguishes	between	avowals	as	acts	and	avowals	as	products	and	
allows	that	acts	of	avowing	express	both	an	underlying	avowed	men-
tal	state	and	a	self-attributive	belief.	In	both	cases,	I	think	the	resulting	
expressivist	views	have	conceded	too	much	to	their	competition	and	
thereby	undermined	their	putative	principal	advantages	over	the	rival	
view	in	each	area.	This	is	the	main	thesis	of	this	paper,	which	I	aim	to	
defend	in	§2	and	§3	below.
It’s	 interesting	 that	 contemporary	 avowal	 expressivists	 have	 not	
tried	to	use	the	quasi-realist	strategy	for	meeting	the	objection	from	
epistemic	 continuity	 as	 it	 confronts	 their	 view,	 and	 that	 contempo-
rary	 ethical	 expressivists	 have	 not	 tried	 to	 use	 the	 neo-expressivist	
strategy	for	meeting	the	objection	from	semantic	continuity	as	it	con-
fronts	their	view.	This	raises	the	question:	Could	a	bit	of	theoretical	
This	is	the	Frege-Geach	objection.	Geach	(1965)	challenged	expressivists	to	
explain	 how	mere	 expressions	 of	motivational	 attitudes	 could	 be	 logically	
related	in	the	way	necessary	to	underwrite	patently	valid	inferences.	There	
has	been	a	cottage	industry	of	proposed	solutions	and	counterarguments	to	
Geach’s	objection	—	see	especially	Blackburn	(1988),	Stoljar	(1993),	Gibbard	
(2003),	Ridge	(2006),	Schroeder	(2008).	Here	I	will	say	very	little	about	this	
debate,	except	to	register	my	view	that	Geach’s	objection	must	be	met	for	any	
expressivist	view	—	be	it	about	ethical	statements	or	about	avowals	—	to	sur-
vive.	The	present	focus,	however,	will	be	on	the	two	more	intuitive	objections	
from	epistemic	continuity	and	semantic	continuity.	
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facto,	 they	do	not	 represent	a	privileged	kind	of	knowledge	 that	we	
have”	 (p.	342).	Rather	 than	adopt	a	deflationary	stance	 towards	self-
knowledge,	she	seeks	to	answer	this	worry	in	a	nondeflationary	way.	
Her	strategy	is,	first,	to	argue	that	avowals	express	both	a	first-order	
mental	state	(i. e.,	the	underlying	desire,	love,	pain,	etc.)	and,	in	a	quali-
fied	sense,	a	second-order	self-ascriptive	belief	(i. e.,	that	the	avower	is	
in	the	state	of	desire,	love,	pain,	etc.).	This	is	a	version	of	what	Bar-On	
calls	the	“dual-expression	thesis”.	Then	she	argues	that	endorsing	the	
dual	expression	thesis	makes	her	version	of	expressivism	consistent	
with	several	different	accounts	of	why	such	self-beliefs	are	often	war-
ranted	and	true.	And	it	is	this	that	entitles	her	to	the	recognition	that,	
contra deflationism,	 they	are	often	manifestations	of	genuine	knowl-
edge	(pp.	307–310;	340–396).11
Although	 there	 is	 work	 to	 be	 done	 to	 spell	 out	 the	 precise	 na-
ture	of	self-knowledge	on	 this	view,	 I	want	 to	grant	 that	 this	 line	of	
thought	succeeds	in	letting	the	expressivist	resist	deflationism	about	
self-knowledge.	For	on	Bar-On’s	view,	avowals	now	express	(in	part)	
beliefs,	 which	 can	 be	 true	 and	warranted.	 Given	 how	 drastic	 defla-
tionism	 is,	 this	move	 away	 from	 deflationism	 surely	makes	 avowal	
expressivism	more	 attractive.	Nonetheless,	 I	worry	 that	 adoption	of	
the	dual-expression	thesis	carries	a	significant	dialectical	burden.	For,	
recall	that	the	primary	advantages	of	avowal	expressivism	are	the	epis-
temological	and	cognitive	parsimony	it	gains	in	not	having	to	appeal	
to	introspection	as	a	way	to	explain	the	typical	unchallengeability	and	
first-personal	 authority	of	 avowals.	However,	 if	 the	neo-expressivist	
now	allows	that	avowals	express	self-ascriptive	beliefs	after	all,	then	
the	question	about	the	epistemic	status	and	cognitive	source	of	these	
beliefs	is	renewed,	and	one	wonders	whether	we	won’t	be	forced	back	
into	a	form	of	introspectionism	to	answer	it.
11.	 She	actually	sketches	three	separate	accounts	of	self-knowledge	that	are	each	
non-deflationary	and	consistent	with	her	neo-expressivist	view	of	avowals:	a	
“low	road”,	a	“high	road”,	and	a	“middle	road”	account	of	self-knowledge.	See	
Bar-On	(2004,	pp.	369–388).	Each	of	these	accounts	turns	on	her	claim	that,	
in	 addition	 to	 an	 underlying	 mental	 state,	 avowals	 express	 self-ascriptive	
beliefs.	
a	deflationary	view	of	self-knowledge	is	unsatisfactorily	drastic.	After	
all,	even	the	expressivist	should	agree	that	we	have	the	mental	states	
we	express.	So,	whether	or	not	she	thinks	avowals	are	 true	because	
they	correctly	describe	 this	extant	mental	 reality,	 the	avowal	expres-
sivist	needs	there	to	be	an	extant	mental	reality	corresponding	to	these	
statements.	Moreover,	given	that	she	is	committed	to	the	existence	of	
such	a	mental	reality,	and	given	that	the	typical	unchallengeability	of	
avowals	comprises	 (in	part)	protection	 from	epistemic	criticism	and	
doubt,	it	would	be	quite	strange	if	the	continued	justification	for	treat-
ing	avowals	as	specially	unchallengeable	were	not	due	to	the	fact	that	
such	avowals	tended,	 in	a	special	way,	to	get	things	right	about	this	
mental	reality.	But	if	they	do	this,	then	surely	they	are	somewhere	in	
the	neighborhood	of	manifesting	genuine	self-knowledge.
It	is	largely	for	this	reason	that	contemporary	avowal	expressivists	
have	avoided	deflationism	about	self-knowledge.10	But	that	leaves	the	
objection	 from	 epistemic	 continuity	 unanswered	 for	 avowal	 expres-
sivism.	How	can	one	be	an	avowal	expressivist	but	recognize	the	pos-
sibility	that	avowals	can	be	manifestations	of	knowledge?	
The	 most	 sophisticated	 and	 worked-out	 attempt	 to	 answer	 this	
question	comes	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	neo-expressivist	view	of	avowals	
defended	in	Bar-On	(2004).	She	defends	a	view	that	distinguishes	be-
tween	avowals	as	expressive	acts	and	avowals	as	linguistic	products	of	
these	acts.	She	suggests	that	‘avowal’	“can	be	read	as	referring	to	some-
one’s	act	of	avowing,	which	is	an	event	in	the	world	with	a	certain	caus-
al	history	and	certain	action	properties;	but	it	can	also	be	read	as	refer-
ring	to	the	result	or	product	of	such	act	—	a	linguistic	(or	language-like)	
token,	an	item	with	certain	semantic	properties”	(p.	251).	According	to	
her,	acts	of	avowing	gain	their	distinctive	features	from	the	fact	that	
they	express	the	mental	state	that	is	avowed.	But	she	recognizes	that	
one	might	worry	 that,	on	 this	expressivist	view,	avowals	 “cannot	be	
taken	to	articulate	things	we	genuinely	know	about	ourselves,	and	ipso 
10.	Compare	 McGeer	 (1996),	 Bar-On	 (2004),	 and	 Wright	 (1998,	 pp.	 34–43),	
though	Wright	doesn’t	endorse	 the	expressivist	view	he	discusses.	One	ex-
ception	to	this	claim	is	perhaps	Jacobsen	(1996).
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whether	I	am	in	pain.	In	effect,	Bar-On	admits	this.	She	writes,	“In	the	
case	of	avowals,	unlike	the	case	of	purely	dispositional	beliefs,	a	sub-
ject	actively	engages	 in	an	act	of	producing	a	mental	 self-ascription	
(in	speech	or	in	thought)…	.On	the	Neo-Expressivist	account,	when	
avowing	feeling	thirsty,	I	am	saying	or	thinking	that	I	am	feeling	thirsty”	
(p.	365).	And	she	seems	to	think	that	this	helps	her	account.	She	writes,
[T]he	Neo-Expressivist	can	allow	that	avowals	represent	
beliefs	 that	 subjects	have	about	 themselves	not	only	 in	
the	 sense	of	holding	 true	 (as	 expounded	above)	but	 in	
a	 more	 robust,	 ‘self-ascriptive’	 sense.	 Subjects	 can	 be	
credited	with	the	relevant	beliefs	to	the	extent	that	they	
can	be	seen	as	intentionally	issuing	self-ascriptions	that	
represent	those	beliefs	when	avowing.	If	so,	then	we	can	
maintain	that	avowing	involves	a	subject’s	expressing	her	
first-order	mental	condition	without	denying	that	avow-
als	 represent	 beliefs	we	 have	 in	 the	 sense	 required	 for	
knowledge.	(Ibid.)
But	if	this	is	the	sense	of	‘belief’	on	which	avowals	express	beliefs,	then	
it	surely	is	not	mere	holdings-true.	We	seem	to	have	a	belief	that	is	the	
result	of	an	active	judgment,	and	so	the	question	again	arises	about	
the	cognitive	source	of	this	belief	and	why	it	has	the	special	epistemic	
security	 manifested	 in	 first-personal	 authority.	 Could	 Bar-On	 deny	
that	the	first	personal	authority	of	this	belief	derives	from	its	cognitive	
source	or	even	deny	that	it	has	a	cognitive	source	altogether,	since	it	
doesn’t	seem	to	be	based	on	any	specific	evidence?
To	 be	 sure,	 the	 puzzling	 thing	 about	 the	 beliefs	 ostensibly	 ex-
pressed	by	avowals	 is	 that,	 like	 the	avowals	 that	express	 them,	 they	
seem	to	be	very	secure	from	epistemic	challenge	and	yet	to	result	from	
active	judgments	for	which	one	doesn’t	seem	to	have	or	be	able	to	of-
fer	any	specific	evidence.	However,	this	doesn’t	imply	that	they	have	
no	cognitive	source;	if	we	have	active	judgments	and	not	mere	hold-
ings-true,	there	has	to	be	some	cognitive	faculty	or	method	by	which	
they	are	formed.	It’s	a	further	question	whether	this	faculty	or	method	
As	far	as	I	can	tell,	Bar-On	wants	to	avoid	this	question	by	means	of	
the	distinction	she	makes	between	two	different	senses	of	‘belief’.	She	
writes,	“In	what	we	may	call	the	opining	sense,	one	believes	that	p	 if	
one	has	entertained	the	thought	that	p	and	has	formed	the	active	judg-
ment	that	p	on	some	basis,	where	one	has	(and	could	offer)	specific	
evidence	or	reasons	for	that	judgment”	(p.	363).	And	she	suggests	that	
this	is	to	be	distinguished	from
a	second,	more	liberal	sense	of	belief,	in	which	a	subject	
believes	that	p,	provided	(roughly)	that	she	would	accept	
p	upon	considering	it.	This	holding-true,	as	we	may	refer	
to	it,	is	the	one	we	apply	when	we	say	that	people	have	
beliefs	concerning	matters	they	have	not	yet	considered.	
For	example,	I	may	not	presently	have	any	active	opinion,	
formed	on	some	specific	basis,	regarding	matters	such	as	
the	color	of	rain	in	Spain,	or	the	sum	of	some	numbers…
yet	 if	 suitably	 prompted,	 I	 would	 affirm	 the	 relevant	
claims.	(p.	364)	
In	 her	 view,	 an	 avower	 may	 be	 said	 to	 believe	 the	 content	 of	 the	
avowal	in	the	holding-true	sense	but	not	in	the	opining	sense.	This	is	
supposed	to	help	avoid	the	question	about	the	epistemic	status	and	
cognitive	source	of	these	beliefs.	The	idea	is	that,	since	holding-true	
doesn’t	require	the	active	formulation	of	a	judgment,	one	can	count	
as	believing	that	p	in	the	sense	of	holding-true	that	p	even	if	this	be-
lief	has	no	cognitive	source	whatsoever,	and	 the	epistemic	status	of	
this	belief	 can	be	explained	 in	any	number	of	ways	 consistent	with	
rejecting	 introspectionism	 as	 long	 as	 they	 don’t	 appeal	 to	 a	 special	
	cognitive	source.
However,	 even	 if	we	grant	 this	 distinction	between	opining	 and	
holding-true,	the	problem	with	this	strategy	for	evading	the	question	
about	the	epistemic	status	and	cognitive	source	of	the	beliefs	ostensi-
bly	expressed	by	avowals	is	that	these	beliefs	are	not	plausibly	thought	
of	 as	mere	 holdings-true.	When	 I	 avow	 “I’m	 in	 pain,”	 it	 is	 not	 plau-
sible	to	claim	that	I	believe	I	am	in	pain	but	I	have	not	yet	considered	
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as	 an	 (expressive)	 act	 and	 an	 epistemic	 reason	 for	 the	 avowal	 un-
derstood	 as	 representative	 of	 the	 subject’s	 self-judgment”	 (p.	 390).	
The	 idea	here	 seems	 to	 be	 that	 the	 self-ascriptive	 beliefs	 expressed	
by	 avowals	 are	 formed	 in	 a	 special	 way	—	on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	men-
tal	state	that	they	mention.	But	that	just	sounds	like	a	new	version	of	
the	introspectionist	strategy	for	explaining	the	distinctiveness	of	self-
knowledge.	However,	to	collapse	avowal	expressivism	into	a	form	of	
introspectionism	—	even	a	novel	form	of	introspectionism	—	is	surely	
to	lose	the	primary	advantage	of	avowal	expressivism.	For	instead	of	
avoiding	appeal	to	introspection	as	a	way	to	explain	the	unchallenge-
ability	and	first-personal	authority	of	avowals,	we’d	be	back,	at	least	
implicitly,	to	positing	some	special	faculty	or	method	for	forming	dis-
tinctively	secure	beliefs	about	one’s	own	mental	states.
At	other	times,	however,	Bar-On	appears	to	want	to	avoid	just	this	
sort	of	collapse.	She	writes,	“The	[neo-expressivist]	account	needs	to	
insist	that	avowals’	distinctive	security	derives	from	the	fact	that	they	
serve	 to	express
1
	subjects’	 self-ascribed	conditions,	 rather	 than	 from	
whatever	 epistemic	 security	 accrues	 to	 any	 self-judgments	 [i. e.,	 sec-
ond-order	beliefs]	subjects	may	[also]	express
1
”	 (p.	366).13	But,	even	
so,	as	 long	as	she	allows	 that	avowals	express	self-ascriptive	beliefs,	
which	are	potentially	articles	of	knowledge,	then	there	will	be	a	ques-
tion	of	why	these	beliefs	are	so	secure	and	how	we	came	to	have	them.	
Bar-On	could	insist	that	this	simply	isn’t	the	explanandum	of	her	theo-
ry,	since	she	aims	to	explain	the	security	of	avowals	rather	than	the	se-
curity	of	the	beliefs	they	express.	But	surely,	once	we’ve	admitted	that	
they	exist	and	are	distinctively	secure,	the	security	of	these	beliefs	is	
something	that	needs	to	be	explained;	and	it	would	be	strange	if	what-
ever	explains	it	isn’t	intimately	related	to	what	explains	the	security	of	
avowals	that	express	them.	However,	for	the	avowal	expressivist	even	
13.	 ‘Express
1
’	—	the	 “action	sense”	of	 ‘express’	—	is	Bar-On’s	 term	for	 the	expres-
sion	relation	between	a	person	and	the	mental	states	he	conveys	by	means	
of	an	expressive	act.	This	contrasts	with	‘express
2
’	(the	“causal	sense”	of	‘ex-
press’)	and	‘express
3
’	(the	“semantic	sense”	of	‘express’.	See	Bar-On	(2004),	p.	
216,	for	the	precise	characterization	of	the	distinction	and	Sellars	(1969)	for	
the	original	statement.
can	be	used	 in	an	account	of	what	 justifies	 the	beliefs,	but	 it	 seems	
that	 there	must	be	 a	 faculty	or	method	nonetheless.	Bar-On’s	oppo-
nents	call	this	“introspection”,	and	so	it	looks	like	they	at	least	have	a	
name	for	what	they	are	trying	to	explain.	But,	by	being	forced	to	admit	
that	avowals	express	self-ascriptive	beliefs	in	a	more	robust	sense	than	
mere	holdings-true,	the	neo-expressivist	seems	just	as	much	commit-
ted	to	the	existence	of	a	special	cognitive	source	for	these	beliefs	and	
so	owes	us	an	explanation	of	what	it	is	and	how	it	works.
To	be	clear	about	my	objection:	none	of	this	is	meant	to	show	that	
Bar-On	has	to	appeal	to	an	“inner-eye”	to	explain	the	cognitive	source	
of	these	beliefs.	But,	on	a	broader	understanding	of	‘introspectionism’,	
the	introspectionist	is	just	someone	who	thinks	that	there	is	some	spe-
cial	cognitive	faculty	or	method	by	which	we	come	to	have	specially	
secure	beliefs	about	our	own	mental	states,	beliefs	that,	when	true,	are	
articles	of	self-knowledge.	On	this	understanding	of	introspectionism,	
I	 think	Bar-On’s	 adoption	of	 the	dual-expression	 thesis	 threatens	 to	
collapse	her	neo-expressivist	position	into	a	form	of	introspectionism.	
For	it	seems	that	as	soon	as	she	endorses	the	dual-expression	thesis	
she	too	owes	us	an	explanation	of	the	special	epistemic	security	and	
cognitive	source	of	self-ascriptive	beliefs.12 
Indeed,	 some	 of	 what	 Bar-On	writes	 encourages	 us	 to	 interpret	
her	as	proposing	a	new	introspectionist	explanation	of	the	security	of	
avowals.	For	 instance,	she	writes,	 “On	the	present	proposal,	what	 is	
epistemically	unique	about	avowals	is	that	the	very	same	thing	—	one’s	
being	in	M	—	provides	both	a	rational	reason	for	the	avowal	understood	
12.	 In	correspondence,	Bar-On	has	told	me	that	she	thinks	it	is	an	empirical	ques-
tion	whether	we	have	a	special	faculty	of	introspection,	but	she	thinks	such	a	
faculty	couldn’t	explain	the	distinctive	security	of	avowals.	But	even	if	that’s	
right,	my	worry	here	is	that	the	dual-expression	thesis	commits	her	to	think-
ing	that	there	is	some	special	way	that	the	self-ascriptive	beliefs	expressed	by	
avowals	are	formed.	And	it	is	precisely	this	that	introspectionists	have	always	
been	trying	to	explain.	Bar-On	can	insist	that	her	explanatory	project	is	differ-
ent:	it’s	to	explain	the	security	of	avowals,	not	the	security	of	the	beliefs	they	
express.	But	then	I’d	say	that	she,	unlike	traditional	avowal	expressivists,	has	
simply	ignored	rather	than	explained	away	the	question	that	animates	intro-
spectionist	accounts.	(Thanks	here	to	Ram	Neta	for	pressing	me	to	be	clearer	
about	my	worry.)
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anti-realism],	 the	 features	 of	moral	 language	…	which	might	 tempt	
people	to	realism”	(p.	171).	The	exact	quasi-realist	means	for	achieving	
this	have	evolved	over	the	last	twenty	years,	but	the	dominant	strategy	
now	is	to	endorse	a	minimalist	conception	of	truth,	according	to	which	
‘p	is	true’	is	intersubstitutable	with	‘p’;	and	truth	is	not,	in	general,	con-
ceived	of	as	a	correspondence	relation.	The	idea	is	to	try	to	earn	the	
expressivist	 the	 right	 to	 talk	of	ethical	 truths	without	committing	 to	
anything	more	than	is	already	committed	to	by	making	unembedded	
ethical	statements.	As	Blackburn	puts	the	point,	“[M]inimalism	about	
truth	allows	us	to	end	up	saying	‘It	is	true	that	kindness	is	good’.	For	
this	means	no	more	than	that	kindness	 is	good,	an	attitude	we	may	
properly	want	to	express”	(1998,	p.	79).	By	denying	that	truth	is	a	ro-
bust	correspondence	relation,	the	quasi-realist	effects	a	sort	of	defla-
tionism	about	the	ontological	commitments	implicit	in	the	indicative	
mood,	which	can	then	be	put	to	service	in	responding	to	the	objection	
from	semantic	continuity	while	maintaining	a	form	of	anti-realism.
But	 it’s	not	only	 talk	of	ethical	 truths	 that	have	 tempted	some	 to	
realism.	 We	 also	 commonly	 embed	 ethical	 sentences	 in	 belief-talk.	
We	say	things	such	as	“I	believe	that	torture	is	wrong”.	And	if	beliefs	
are	thought	to	be	attempts	to	represent	the	facts,	this	would	seem	to	
force	 a	 renewed	 realist	 interpretation	 of	 ordinary	 ethical	 discourse.	
However,	once	we	have	accepted	minimalism	about	truth,	it	can	seem	
easy	to	deflate	the	ontological	import	of	other	allegedly	realist-sound-
ing	ways	of	speaking,	by	pointing	out	putatively	platitudinous	connec-
tions	between	them	and	truth-talk.	Many	people	think	that	to	make	
a	 statement	 is	 just	 to	 express	 a	 belief	 in	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 statement.	
And	this	is	precisely	what	underwrites	quasi-realists	in	extending	their	
minimalism	about	truth-talk	into	minimalism	about	belief-talk	as	well.	
For	 instance,	Gibbard	considers	 the	possibility	 that	 “minimalists	are	
right	for	truth	…	and	for	belief:	there	is	no	more	to	claiming	‘It’s	true	
that	pain	is	bad’	than	to	claiming	that	pain	is	bad	….	To	believe	that	
pain	is	bad	is	just	to	accept	that	it	is”	(2003,	pp.	182–183).	If	all	of	this	is	
right,	then	one	might	think	that	there	is	no	problem	for	the	expressiv-
ist	to	recognize	the	way	ethical	statements	are	embedded	in	belief-talk	
to	engage	the	project	of	explaining	the	special	security	of	these	first-
personal	present-tense	beliefs	about	our	own	mental	states	is,	it	seems	
to	me,	for	her	to	give	up	on	the	primary	advantages	of	the	position	in	
the	debate	with	the	introspectionist.
In	this	way,	the	avowal	expressivist	seems	to	face	a	dilemma	gen-
erated	by	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity.	On	the	one	hand,	
to	deny	the	premise	of	this	objection	by	adopting	deflationism	about	
self-knowledge	seems	drastic	and	misguided.	On	the	other	hand,	 to	
endorse	the	dual-expression	thesis	and	say	that	avowals	do	after	all	
express	 self-ascriptive	 beliefs	 seems	 to	 undermine	 the	 primary	 ad-
vantages	originally	claimed	for	avowal	expressivism.	In	§4	below,	I’ll	
consider	the	suggestion	mentioned	above	that	the	avowal	expressivist	
might	meet	 this	objection	by	 taking	a	play	 from	contemporary	ethi-
cal	expressivists’	playbook.	But	first	I	want	to	switch	arenas	and	argue	
that	recent	attempts	by	ethical	expressivists	to	overcome	the	objection	
from	semantic	continuity	face	a	fate	similar	to	the	neo-expressivist’s	
attempt	to	overcome	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity.	
III. Ethical Expressivism And Semantic Continuity
Ethical	expressivists	have	traditionally	claimed	to	be	able	to	recognize	
ethical	statements	as	non-erroneous	without	committing	to	a	realm	of	
ethical	facts	because	they	don’t	treat	ethical	statements	as	expressive	
of	beliefs	that	seek	to	represent	the	facts.	However,	if	this	is	because	
ethical	 statements	are	 claimed	 to	be	merely	 “expressive”,	 as	 early	ex-
pressivists	seem	to	have	thought,	then	it	is	mysterious	why	we	some-
times	say	 things	 like	 “It’s	 true	 that	 torture	 is	wrong,	but	maybe	 it	 is	
the	better	of	two	evils”.	To	say	that	ordinary	use	of	the	truth-predicate	
in	conjunction	with	ethical	statements	is	mistaken	is	to	bite	a	bullet	
significant	enough	to	make	one	wonder	whether	the	expressivist	is	re-
ally	theorizing	about	our	ordinary	ethical	discourse.	This	is	the	central	
aspect	of	the	objection	from	semantic	continuity.
The	most	 influential	 response	 to	 this	 objection	 was	 initially	 for-
mulated	 in	Blackburn	 (1984),	where	he	proposed	 the	 “enterprise	 of	
quasi-realism”,	which	is	“to	earn,	on	the	slender	basis	[of	expressivist	
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questions:	Does	this	mean	that	all	of	these	terms	are	ambiguous,	and	
if	so,	what	empirical	evidence	is	there	for	that	claim?	What	about	con-
texts	where	the	two	senses	seem	to	be	mixed	such	as	”Everything	the	
Pope	said	today	is	true/TRUE”	or	“She	believes/BELIEVES	that	either	
your	action	was	wrong	or	 it	causes	no	harm”?	Because	I	 think	these	
questions	are	impossible	to	answer	satisfactorily,	I	demur	at	bifurcat-
ing	senses	of	all	of	the	terms	relevant	to	marking	out	the	distinction	
between	realism	and	irrealism.
If	we	don’t	do	that,	however,	we	seem	to	lose	our	grip	on	what’s	
at	 issue	between	 realists	 and	expressivists.	 It	 is	because	of	 this	 that	
Dreier	 writes,	 “Minimalism	 sucks	 the	 substance	 out	 of	 heavy-duty	
metaphysical	 concepts.	 If	 successful,	 it	 can	help	Expressivism	 recap-
ture	 the	 ordinary	 realist	 language	 of	 ethics.	 But	 in	 so	 doing	 it	 also	
threatens	to	make	irrealism	indistinguishable	from	realism”	(2004,	p.	
26).15	But	 if	 this	 is	 right,	 then	 the	quasi-realist	enterprise	has	 the	de-
fect	of	divorcing	the	expressivist’s	leading	idea,	that	ethical	statements	
express	a	mental	 state	 interestingly	different	 from	 the	mental	 states	
expressed	by	uncontroversially	descriptive	statements,	from	the	first	
principal	advantage	of	 this	 idea,	which	 is	 that	 statements	 that	don’t	
Roughly,	beliefs	in	the	minimalist	sense	are	what	causally	regulate	ordinary	
use	of	the	word	‘belief’,	while	it	is	beliefs	in	the	robust	sense	that	are	part	of	
a	mature	belief-desire	psychology.	His	idea,	then,	is	that	ethical	realists	are	
committed	to	the	view	that	ethical	claims	express	beliefs	in	the	robust	sense,	
while	quasi-realists	expressivists	are	not.	(Thanks	here	to	an	anonymous	ref-
eree	and	Michael	Ridge	for	pressing	me	to	address	the	possibility	of	multiple	
senses	of	the	relevant	terms.)
15.	 There	is	more	to	be	said	about	whether	there	is	any	way	within	a	quasi-realist	
framework	to	distinguish	realism	from	irrealism.	Dreier	(2004)	proposes	an	
answer,	drawing	on	answers	suggested	by	O’Leary-Hawthorne	(1996),	Fine	
(2001),	and	Gibbard	(2003).	Roughly,	the	idea	is	to	distinguish	between	be-
liefs	that	p	that	must	be	explained	by	appeal	to	the	fact	that	p	and	those	beliefs	
for	which	this	isn’t	the	case.	Then,	realism	is	supposed	to	be	distinguished	
from	quasi-realism	by	whether	one	holds	that	the	mental	state	expressed	by	
a	statement	is	a	belief	in	the	former	sense.	I’ve	argued	against	this	suggestion	
in	Chrisman	(2008b).	A	lot	depends	on	what	we	mean	by	‘explain’,	but	the	
crux	of	my	argument	is	that	Dreier	et	al.	don’t	get	away	from	using	notions	
(such	as	representation)	whose	ontological	purport	the	minimalist	will	seek	
to	undermine.	
without	 endorsing	 the	 realist	 construal	 of	 this	 feature	of	 ethical	 dis-
course.	The	quasi-realist	expressivist	can	agree	that	ethical	statements	
express	beliefs,	as	long	as	he	endorses	a	minimalist	construal	of	belief-
talk	paralleling	his	minimalist	construal	of	truth-talk.	
In	my	view,	 there	are	 two	problems	with	 this	 line	of	 thought,	at-
taching	 to	 each	of	 the	 advantages	 originally	 claimed	 for	 the	 ethical	
expressivist.	The	first	problem	 is	 that	 it	 threatens	 to	undermine	 the	
whole	realism/antirealism	debate	in	metaethics.	The	second	problem	
is	 that	 it	 undermines	 the	 expressivist’s	 claim	 to	 psychological	 parsi-
mony.	Let	me	explain.
The	first	advantage	originally	claimed	 for	 the	ethical	expressivist	
was	that	he	could	explain	the	legitimacy	of	ethical	discourse	without	
positing	an	underlying	ethical	 reality,	and	 thus	gained	a	measure	of	
ontological	 parsimony	 over	 his	 realist	 competitors.	 However,	 once	
we	endorse	a	general	minimalist	understanding	of	‘true’	and	‘belief’,	it	
becomes	hard	to	stop	minimalism	from	undermining	every	way	that	
ethical	expressivism	might	be	distinguished	from	realism.	For	what	is	
a	proposition	if	not	just	the	content	of	a	truth-apt	sentence	or	the	belief	
it	expresses?	And	what	is	a	 fact	 if	not	just	a	true	proposition?	Going	
minimalist	about	truth	and	belief	and	related	notions	means	that	the	
quasi-realist	expressivist	can	say	that	some	ethical	statements	express	
true	 propositions,	 and	 that,	 when	 they	 are	 true,	 they	 state	 facts,	 in	
which	the	author	of	the	statement	believes.	However,	then	we	should	
wonder:	what	makes	this	an	antirealist	position?
Some	have	 suggested	 that	we	posit	 two	different	 senses	 to	 each	
of	 these	 terms,	depending	on	whether	 they	are	used	 in	conjunction	
with	descriptive	discourse	or	ethical	discourse.	For	example,	perhaps	
we	can	distinguish	between	realist	and	deflationary	senses	of	‘true’	by	
using	all	capitals	(‘TRUE’)	to	refer	to	the	former	and	lowercase	(‘true’)	
to	refer	to	the	latter,	and	likewise	with	‘BELIEF’/’belief’	and	all	of	the	
other	relevant	terms.14	However,	that	would	immediately	invite	vexing	
14.	 Timmons	 (1999,	 pp.	 152–154)	 suggests	 something	 like	 this	 strategy.	 Along	
related	lines,	Ridge	(forthcoming)	suggests	that	we	can	avoid	creeping	mini-
malism	by	distinguishing	between	 robust	 and	minimalist	 senses	of	 ‘belief’.	
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I	 said	 above	 that	 I	 think	 there’s	 a	 problem	with	 the	quasi-realist	
response	to	the	objection	from	semantic	continuity	attaching	to	each	
of	the	traditional	advantages	of	expressivism.	The	second	advantage	
was	that	expressivism	has	a	very	direct	explanation	of	the	distinctively	
tight	 connection	between	 ethical	 judgments	 and	motivations	 to	 act.	
Because	ethical	judgments	just	are	a	sort	of	motivational	attitude,	ex-
pressivism	purports	to	give	us	an	explanation	of	the	practical	nature	
of	ethical	 thought	 that	 is	psychologically	parsimonious	 in	 the	sense	
that	 it	doesn’t	require	any	special	psychological	story	about	the	con-
nection	between	ethical	beliefs	and	motivations.	And	it	may	seem	that	
this	is	what	expressivism	has	to	add	even	after	going	minimalist	about	
all	of	the	putatively	ontologically	committing	notions.	However,	once	
we	have	endorsed	minimalism	about	‘belief’,	it’s	hard	to	see	how	the	
expressivist’s	 account	 of	 the	 connection	between	 ethical	 judgments	
and	motivations	is	any	different	from	a	realist	who	says	that	some	be-
liefs	have	a	special	motivational	capacity.	After	all,	the	quasi-realist	ex-
pressivist	is	going	to	say	that	an	ethical	statement	such	as	“Torture	is	
wrong”	expresses	the	belief	that	torture	is	wrong,	since	to	believe	this	
is	just	to	accept	that	torture	is	wrong.	And	now	either	this	acceptance	
does	or	does	not	have	 a	distinctive	motivational	 capacity.	 If	 it	 does,	
the	expressivist’s	explanation	of	the	practical	nature	of	ethical	thought	
looks	like	it	has	collapsed	into	one	identical	to	the	realist	who	says	that	
ethical	beliefs	are	specially	motivational.	If	it	does	not,	the	expressiv-
ist’s	explanation	will	owe	us	just	the	same	sort	of	psychological	expla-
nation	of	the	connection	between	ethical	beliefs	and	motivations	that	
his	view	was	designed	to	avoid	in	hopes	of	psychological	parsimony.	
Again,	either	way,	it’s	not	clear	what	advantages	ethical	expressivism	
in	its	quasi-realist	manifestation	brings	to	the	debate.
If	 the	 argument	of	 the	previous	 six	paragraphs	 is	 right,	 then	 the	
quasi-realist	expressivist	attempt	to	answer	the	objection	from	seman-
tic	continuity	has	led	to	the	same	fate	as	the	neo-expressivist	attempt	
to	answer	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity.	In	the	end,	both	so-
phistications	of	the	original	expressivist	idea	have	conceded	so	much	
to	 their	 competitors	 that	 they	 have	 lost	 the	 distinctive	 advantages	
express	genuine	beliefs	do	not	ontologically	commit	their	authors	to	
a	corresponding	fact.	
Does	this	mean	that	the	expressivist	cum	global	minimalist	position	
represented	by	quasi-realism	collapses	into	the	sort	of	realism	that	it	
was	designed	to	avoid?	It’s	not	entirely	clear.	Some	think	that	it	does,16 
but	the	quasi-realist	might	insist	that,	if	his	program	is	carried	through	
successfully,	 then	 there	 is	no	 longer	 the	problem	with	realism.	That	
is	to	say	that	he’ll	grant	that	ethical	claims	are	truth-apt	and	express	
beliefs,	some	of	which	are	true	of	the	ethical	facts;	but	he’ll	insist	that	
none	of	this	is	to	be	interpreted	in	an	ontologically	committing	way.17 
However,	unless	we	can	say	what	is	to	be	interpreted	in	an	ontologi-
cally	committing	way,	this	represents	a	move	to	the	quietist	idea	that	
there	is	no	sense	to	be	made	of	ontological	debate	about	realism.	The	
idea	is	that,	although	we	sometimes	find	it	useful	to	talk	about	truths,	
facts,	beliefs,	etc.,	none	of	this	answers	ontological	questions	about	the	
real	nature	of	reality,	since	those	questions	are	meaningless.	
It’s	unclear	to	me	whether	this	move	to	ontological	quietism	is	co-
gent	on	its	own	terms,	but	what	is	important	to	realize	in	the	present	
context	is	that	adopting	it	undermines	the	dialectical	advantage	of	the	
core	 expressivist	 strategy	 for	 capturing	an	ontological	difference	be-
tween	ethical	and	descriptive	discourse.	That	strategy	turned	on	claim-
ing	an	expressive	 contrast	between	ethical	 statements	 and	ordinary	
statements,	in	order	to	gain	a	contrast	in	the	ontological	commitment	
involved	 in	ethical	discourse	and	other	 sorts	of	discourse.	With	 the	
move	to	quasi-realist	forms	of	expressivism,	however,	we	can	sympa-
thize	when	realists	on	the	one	hand	and	quietists	on	the	other	wonder	
what	it	is	that	expressivism	cum	global	minimalism	is	supposed	to	do	
for	them.	After	all,	all	participants	to	this	debate	now	agree	that	ethi-
cal	claims	express	beliefs	that	may	be	true	of	the	ethical	facts.	Either	
that	commits	one	ontologically	or	it	doesn’t,	but	expressivism	doesn’t	
seem	to	have	anything	to	add.
16.	 Compare	Dworkin	(1996).
17.	 Compare	Price	(2003,	2004).
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part	of	the	avowal	expressivist,	and	two	unorthodox	commitments	on	
the	part	of	the	ethical	expressivist
IV. A Different Response to the Objection from Epistemic Continuity
We	 haven’t	 yet	 discussed	 how	 ethical	 expressivists	 respond	 to	 the	
objection	 from	epistemic	 continuity.	Early	 ethical	 expressivists	 such	
as	Ayer	 (1936)	 adopted	 expressivism	 in	 part	 precisely	 because	 they	
thought	 there	 was	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 genuinely	 ethical	 knowledge.	
However,	 the	 drastic	 nature	 of	 this	 view	was	 partly	 responsible	 for	
the	demise	of	early	expressivism.	After	all,	the	phenomenon	of	claim-
ing	and	ascribing	ethical	knowledge	is	quite	robust.	And	this	has	led	
contemporary	ethical	expressivists	to	try	to	capture	rather	than	reject	
the	epistemic	continuity	between	ethical	statements	and	descriptive	
statements.	 However,	 interestingly,	 these	 ethical	 expressivists	 have	
not	sought	 to	meet	 the	analogous	application	of	 the	objection	 from	
epistemic	continuity	by	embracing	anything	like	the	dual-expression	
thesis18	and	they	are	not	deflationists	about	ethical	knowledge.	Instead,	
they	ask	us	to	reflect	on	epistemic	discourse	in	general,	and	they	pro-
pose	an	expressivist-friendly	account	of	what	we	are	doing	when	we	
attribute	knowledge.	In	this	section,	I	want	to	consider	this	move	be-
cause	it	may	look	like	some	variant	of	it	would	save	avowal	expressiv-
ism	from	the	criticisms	leveled	above.	My	suggestion,	however,	will	be	
that	whatever	help	it	may	provide	to	the	ethical	expressivist	in	defend-
ing	his	view	from	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity,	this	move	is	
much	more	radical	when	used	by	the	avowal	expressivist.
18.	 One	possible	exception	to	this	claim	is	Copp	(2001);	however,	the	position	he	
defends	is	explicitly	a	form	of	realism,	albeit	‘realist-expressivism’.	This	view	
is	discussed	much	more	in	Bar-On	and	Chrisman	(2009).	Gert	(2006,	2007)	
defends	a	version	of	the	dual-expression	thesis	for	at	least	some	normative	
claims;	however,	he	is	not	an	expressivist.	There	are	hybrid	expressivist	views,	
such	as	Tresan	(2006),	Ridge	(2006)	and	Boisvert	(forthcoming),	which	treat	
ethical	statements	as	expressing	both	a	belief	and	a	motivational	attitude,	but	
these	are	not	endorsements	of	 the	dual-expression	 thesis	because	 the	con-
tent	of	the	relevant	belief	is	not	the	same	as	the	content	of	the	statement.	I	am	
bracketing	these	in	the	present	discussion,	in	order	to	explore	more	fully	the	
similarities	and	dissimilarities	between	non-hybrid	expressivist	views	about	
both	avowals	and	ethical	statements.
originally	 claimed	 for	 expressivism	 in	 each	 area.	 These	 advantages	
had	to	do	with	parsimony,	and	of	course,	some	philosophers	won’t	be	
so	moved	by	considerations	of	parsimony.	However,	for	those	philoso-
phers	who	are	attracted	to	the	expressivist	view	of	ethical	statements	
and/or	avowals	because	of	 the	parsimony	 those	views	promise,	 the	
conclusion	here	should	be	disheartening.
In	what	follows,	I	want	to	consider	two	theoretical	possibilities	that	
the	discussion	so	 far	has	 left	open.	 I	 said	at	 the	outset	 that	both	ex-
pressivist	views	face	both	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity	and	
the	objection	from	semantic	continuity.	However,	the	structure	of	my	
critical	 argument	against	 recent	 sophisticated	attempts	 to	overcome	
these	objections	in	either	arena	has,	in	each	case,	focused	on	just	one	
of	 the	 objections.	My	 criticism	of	 Bar-On’s	 neo-expressivism	has	 fo-
cused	on	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity	and	my	criticism	of	
Blackburn	and	Gibbard’s	quasi-realism	has	focused	on	the	objection	
from	semantic	continuity.	As	it	turns	out,	each	of	these	philosophers	
has	also	attempted	to	overcome	the	objection	that	I	haven’t	focused	
on	with	respect	to	their	view.	That	is	to	say	that	Bar-On	has	a	response	
to	the	objection	from	semantic	continuity,	and	Blackburn	and	Gibbard	
have	a	response	to	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity.	Although	
I	think	these	responses	to	those	objections	are	more	promising	than	
the	ones	I	have	discussed,	they	won’t	by	themselves	help	the	case	of	
either	neo-expressivism	or	quasi-realism	against	my	criticisms	above.	
However,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 symmetry,	 there	 does	 remain	 the	 theoreti-
cal	possibility	that	each	kind	of	expressivist	could	adopt	a	play	from	
the	other’s	playbook	to	provide	a	new	response	to	the	relevant	objec-
tion	and	avoid	my	criticisms.	I	think	this	would	change	the	nature	of	
these	views	so	much	that	it	would	make	the	labels	‘neo-expressivism’	
and	‘quasi-realism’	misleading,	but	it	would	be	a	possibility	for	saving	
expressivism	about	avowals	and/or	ethical	statements	from	my	criti-
cisms	so	far.	It	is	this	possibility	that	I	want	to	explore,	somewhat	more	
speculatively,	in	the	remainder	of	this	paper.	My	argument	will	be	that	
making	 this	 possibility	work	 involves	 a	 radical	 commitment	 on	 the	
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more	radical	than	the	metaethical	reorientation	that	expressivists	have	
already	proposed	of	the	project	of	the	theory	of	the	good.	After	all,	it	
is	characteristic	of	ethical	expressivism	to	ask	not	about	goodness	but	
about	judgments	that	something	is	good;	and,	likewise,	when	consid-
ering	another	normative	concept,	 ‘knowledge’,	expressivists	are	now	
urging	us	to	ask	not	about	knowledge	but	about	judgments	that	some-
one	knows	something.	And	just	as	metaethical	expressivism	remains	
relatively	neutral	about	specific	normative	ethical	debates	about	the	
good,	 this	 meta-epistemological	 account	 can	 also	 remain	 relatively	
neutral	about	specific	normative	epistemological	debates	such	as	 in-
ternalism	versus	externalism,	coherentism	versus	foundationalism,	etc.
Moreover,	from	the	expressivist	point	of	view,	there	are	a	couple	of	
considerations	speaking	in	its	favor.	First,	knowledge	statements	are	
often	said	to	be	normative;	and	since	expressivism	is	often	thought	of	
as	a	framework	for	normative	statements	in	general,	it’s	very	natural	to	
extend	it	from	ethical	claims	to	epistemic	claims.	Second,	this	strategy	
provides	for	a	general	account	of	knowledge	statements,	which	when	
applied	to	ethical	and	descriptive	statements	can	explain	why	both	are	
possible	manifestations	of	knowledge,	regardless	of	one’s	account	of	
the	mental	state	expressed	by	making	these	statements.	For	an	expres-
sivist	to	succeed	at	that	explanation	just	is	to	succeed	at	meeting	the	
objection	from	epistemic	continuity.
So,	whether	or	not	Blackburn’s	and	Gibbard’s	meta-epistemological	
accounts	of	knowledge	attributions	are	ultimately	defensible,	I	think	
this	general	orientation	towards	the	objection	from	epistemic	continu-
ity	coheres	well	enough	with	the	rest	of	the	ethical	expressivist’s	view	
to	grant	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	it	provides	a	successful	internal	
response	to	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity	—	“internal”	in	the	
sense	that	an	ethical	expressivist	who	endorses	it	cannot	be	rationally	
criticized	for	specifically	failing	to	meet	the	objection	from	epistemic	
continuity	in	a	way	consistent	with	his	overall	theory.20 
I	grant	this	so	that	we	can	ask,	Would	a	similar	strategy	help	the	
20.	Some	have	 argued	 that	 an	 extension	of	 expressivism	 to	 epistemic	notions	
incurs	 special	 problems	not	 faced	by	 ethical	 versions	of	 expressivism.	 See	
Blackburn	suggests	that	“the	primary	function	of	talking	of	‘knowl-
edge’	is	to	indicate	that	a	judgment	is	beyond	revision.	That	is,	we	rule	
out	any	chance	that	an	improvement	might	occur,	that	would	properly	
lead	to	a	revision	of	the	judgment”	(1998,	p.	318).	I	think	we	should	un-
derstand	this	along	the	lines	of	Gibbard’s	(2003)	attempt	to	extend	his	
expressivist	theory	of	ethical	statements	into	an	expressivist	theory	of	
knowledge	statements	themselves.	The	core	idea	is	to	treat	statements	
of	the	form	‘S	knows	that	p’	as	themselves	expressions	of	plans	rather	
than	factual	beliefs.	Specifically,	because	he	thinks	that	“the	concept	
of	knowing	serves	to	guide	us	in	relying	on	some	kinds	of	judgments	
and	not	on	others”	(p.	227),	he	suggests	that	knowledge	attributions	
themselves	are	the	expression	of	plans	to	rely	on	someone’s	judgment	
about	something.19	He	writes,	“[A]ttributions	of	knowledge	are	plan-
laden.	 Joe	 knows	 there	 are	 cows	 on	 the	 hill,	 we	 say;	 he	 knows	 be-
cause	he	sees	them.	This	means	very	roughly	…	that	judgments	like	
his	are	to	be	relied	on.	Concluding	that	Joe	knows,	then,	amounts	to	
planning	to	rely	on	his	judgment”	(ibid.).	And	Gibbard	argues	that	this	
account	of	 attributions	of	 knowledge	of	 some	matter	of	 fact	 can	be	
easily	extended	 to	account	 for	attributions	of	knowledge	of	what	 to	
do.	He	writes,	“Plan-laden	judgments	may	be	true,	in	a	minimal	sense,	
and	they	can	be	formed	in	a	way	to	rely	on.	The	finding	that	a	judg-
ment	meets	these	conditions	is	plan-laden”	(p.	235).	That	is	to	say	that	
when	one	attributes	knowledge	to	someone	of	what	to	do,	the	act	of	
making	this	statement	is	an	act	of	expressing	a	plan	(roughly)	to	rely	
on	a	particular	 sort	of	 judgment,	 rather	 than	an	act	of	 expressing	a	
	factual	belief.	
To	many	epistemologists,	 this	will	 seem	 like	a	 radical	account	of	
knowledge,	but	in	fairness	to	Blackburn	and	Gibbard,	I	think	it	should	
be	viewed	not	as	a	theory	of	knowledge	but	as	a	meta-epistemological	
reorientation	of	the	project	of	the	theory	of	knowledge,	which	is	no	
19.	 In	Chrisman	(2007)	I	argued	that	 there’s	a	simple	way	to	extend	Gibbard’s	
(1990)	analysis	of	ascriptions	of	rationality	to	knowledge	attributions	in	a	way	
that	overcomes	 two	objections	 threatening	epistemic	contextualism.	 I	 take	
this	to	be	consistent	with	Gibbard’s	(2003)	suggestion	mentioned	in	the	text	
above.
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always	have	 sufficient	 reason	 to	plan	 to	 rely	on	 someone’s	 avowals.	
Why?	 Because	 they	 are	 direct	 expressions	 of	 mental	 states	 rather	
than	attempts	to	discern	what	mental	states	the	avower	is	in.	To	say	
that	they	are	manifestations	of	distinctively	secure	knowledge	would,	
then,	be	to	express	a	specially	entrenched	plan	to	rely	on	them. This	
is	how	Gibbard’s	strategy	for	answering	the	objection	from	epistemic	
continuity	might	be	extended	 to	help	avowal	expressivism	with	 the	
	same	objection.
If	 this	could	work,	 it	would	be	a	nice	result	 for	avowal	expressiv-
ism	—	in	effect,	saving	the	position	from	the	dilemma	between	defla-
tionism	and	introspectionism	about	self-knowledge	that	we	reached	
at	the	end	of	§2.	However,	there	is	a	significant	disanalogy	between	
avowal	 expressivism	 and	 ethical	 expressivism	 that	 undermines	 this	
strategy.	 In	 the	ethical	 case,	 the	expressivist	holds	 that	 ethical	 state-
ments	express	one	unified	kind	of	mental	state.	It’s	the	kind	of	mental	
state	that	is	properly	classified	as	nonbelief	and	puts	the	right	sort	of	
pressure	on	decision	and	action;	perhaps	it’s	a	motivational	attitude,	
a	moral	 sentiment,	 a	 practical	 judgment,	 or	 a	plan.21	 The	 ethical	 ex-
pressivist	maintains	that,	although	states	of	this	kind	are	not	genuine	
beliefs,	they	are	still	things	that	we	can	have	reasons	for	and	against,	
and	they	stand	in	articulable	inferential	relations	to	one	another	and	
to	other	mental	states	and	actions.	By	contrast,	in	the	avowal	case,	the	
expressivist	holds	that	avowals	express	a	motley	assortment	of	men-
tal	 states	—	it’s	whatever	can	be	avowed:	pain,	hunger,	desires,	emo-
tions,	first-order	beliefs,	etc.	It	is	not	plausible	to	think	that	all	of	these	
21.	 This	kind	of	mental	states	may	not	be	unified	in	the	sense	that	there	is	one	
English	word	for	all	of	them.	In	footnote	2,	above,	I	said	that	I	would	leave	it	
vague	how	far	the	class	of	ethical	statements	extends	beyond	claims	about	
what	is	ethically	right	or	wrong.	If	the	expressivist	wants	her	theory	to	apply	
to	statements	deploying	other	ethical	terms,	it	may	actually	help	her	case	to	
have	a	diversity	of	ethical	attitudes	 to	appeal	 to	 in	order	 to	make	sense	of	
obvious	differences	between,	e. g.,	the	claim	that	a	society	is	generous	and	the	
claim	that	a	society	is	 just.	Compare	Blackburn	(1991,	p.	4)	for	the	observa-
tion	that	statements	about	justice	may	express	many	different	kinds	of	senti-
ment.	The	important	point	here,	however,	is	that	the	kind	of	mental	states	the	
ethical	expressivist	claims	to	be	expressed	is	uniformly	involved	in	practical	
reasoning	and	decision.
avowal	 expressivist	 to	 achieve	 a	 similarly	 internal	 response	 to	 the	
analogous	application	of	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity?	The	
idea,	 following	Gibbard,	would	be	 to	 explain	why	avowals	 seem	 to	
be	manifestations	of	knowledge	by	 characterizing	 the	attribution	of	
knowledge	 to	an	avower	as	 the	expression	of	a	plan	 to	 rely	on	 this	
person’s	avowal	and	statements	like	it.	For	instance,	when	one	says,	“I	
want	tea”,	we	will	think	that	this	is	the	manifestation	of	knowledge	if	
we	plan,	in	Gibbard’s	sense,	to	rely	on	it	and	statements	like	it.	What	
is	it	to	rely	on	these	statements?	Initially	one	might	question	whether	
it	makes	sense	to	rely	on	someone’s	statements	if	these	statements	do	
not	express	beliefs	with	the	same	content	as	 the	statement,	but	 this	
would	be	a	mistake.	For	consider	the	statements	“I’m	going	to	go	to	the	
party”,	which	is	typically	used	primarily	to	express	an	intention	to	go	
to	the	party,	and	“I	believe	that	the	party	starts	at	10	pm”,	which	is	typi-
cally	used	primarily	to	express	a	qualified	belief	that	the	party	starts	
at	10	pm.	It	makes	perfect	sense	to	plan	to	rely	on	these	statement	and	
ones	like	them	in	the	sense	that	when	someone	says,	“I’m	going	to	go	
to	 the	party”,	we	can	 infer	“He’s	going	to	be	at	 the	party”,	and	when	
someone	says,	“I	believe	that	the	party	starts	at	10	pm”,	we	can	infer	
“The	party	probably	starts	at	10	pm”.	These	conclusions	can	then	figure	
as	premises	in	our	future	reasoning	about	things	like	whether	to	make	
an	appearance	at	the	party	and	at	what	time.
The	pay-off	of	this	strategy	for	answering	the	objection	from	epis-
temic	continuity	as	it	threatens	avowal	expressivism	is	that	it	provides	
a	natural	framework	within	which	we	can	discuss	the	distinctive	secu-
rity	apparently	attaching	to	avowals	without	resorting	to	the	introspec-
tionist	strategy	of	explaining	this	security	in	terms	of	a	special	faculty	
or	method	by	which	we	come	to	form	specially	secure	self-ascriptive	
beliefs.	For	one	who	thinks	that	knowledge	statements	express	plan-
laden	 judgments	 can	 countenance	 a	 complex	 structure	 of	 practical	
reasons	 that	 support	 planning	 to	 rely	 on	 someone.	 Perhaps	 the	dis-
tinctive	security	of	avowals	 is	a	reflection	of	 the	 fact	 that	we	almost	
Kvanvig	(2003,	ch.	7),	Cuneo	(2008,	ch.	5–6),	and	Lynch	(forthcoming).	These	
arguments	are	addressed	in	Carter	and	Chrisman	(ms).
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as	manifestations	of	knowledge	though	they	don’t	necessarily	express	
mental	 states	 that	we	 can	 have	 reasons	 for	 and	 against	 or	 that	 can	
plausibly	be	said	to	stand	in	inferential	relations	to	one	another	and	to	
other	mental	states	and	actions.
Above	 I	 suggested	 that	deflationism	about	 self-knowledge	 is	 too	
drastic.	But	 I	also	argued	that,	 if	we	opt	 instead	for	Bar-On’s	neo-ex-
pressivism,	we	commit	ourselves	to	the	view	that	an	avowal	expresses	
a	belief	that	is	the	result	of	an	active	self-ascriptive	judgment,	whose	
special	 cognitive	 source	 and	 epistemological	 security	 must	 be	 ex-
plained;	and	this	concedes	too	much	to	introspectionism.	In	this	sec-
tion	I’ve	been	exploring	the	possibility	of	using	an	expressivist-friend-
ly	account	of	epistemic	evaluations	to	escape	this	dilemma.	However,	
what	we’ve	learned	is	that	the	application	of	this	strategy	to	the	case	
of	 avowals	would	 commit	 the	 avowal	 expressivist	 to	 a	 radically	 im-
plausible	view	about	what	mental	states	can	be	properly	referred	to	
as	knowledge.
V. A Different Response to the Objection from Semantic Continuity
We	 haven’t	 yet	 discussed	 how	 Bar-On	 attempts	 to	 meet	 the	 objec-
tion	from	semantic	continuity	as	it	confronts	her	avowal	expressivism.	
Interestingly,	she	does	not	want	to	follow	quasi-realists	in	adopting	a	
general	minimalist	strategy,	which	seeks	to	earn	realist-sounding	fea-
tures	of	ordinary	discourse	without	committing	 to	realism.	And	this	
makes	sense,	since	it’s	not	part	of	avowal	expressivism	to	be	antirealist	
about	mental	states.	Rather,	she	argues	that	we	can	capture	the	seman-
tic	 continuity	 of	 avowals	 and	 descriptive	 statements	 by	 distinguish-
ing	between	the	act	of	expressing	a	mental	state	and	the	product	of	
this	act.22	She	writes,	“I	think	we	must	distinguish	between	the	act	of	
expressing	and	its	product”	(2004,	p.	251).	As	I	mentioned	in	footnote	
1,	usage	of	the	term	‘statement’	both	in	ordinary	discourse	and	in	the	
22.	Compare	also	Bar-On	and	Long	(2001)	and	Bar-On	(2004,	pp.	216–217)	fol-
lowing	Sellars	(1969),	where	the	distinction	is	articulated	between	two	differ-
ent	senses	of	‘express’;	I	think	these	attach	to	the	difference	between	the	way	
a	speech-act	expresses	and	the	way	its	product	expresses.
different	 kinds	 of	mental	 states	 stand	 in	 articulable	 inferential	 rela-
tions	 to	one	another	 and	 to	other	mental	 states	 and	actions.	 For	 in-
stance,	although	it	does	seem	that	we	can	have	reasons	for	and	against	
thinking	that	we	are	in	a	state	of	pain	or	hunger,	it	doesn’t	seem	that	we	
can	have	reasons	for	and	against	our	pain	or	hunger;	witness	the	fact	
that	it	doesn’t	make	sense	to	say,	“Your	hunger	and	pain	are	unjusti-
fied”.	But	these	are	surely	avowable	mental	states.	
Now,	on	some	ways	of	speaking,	it	may	seem	that	mental	states	like	
pain	and	hunger	can	nonetheless	themselves	be	reasons	for	beliefs	and	
actions;	consider	how	it	does	make	sense	to	say,	“His	pain	and	hunger	
justified	the	extreme	measures”.	However,	I	don’t	think	this	is	evidence	
that	mental	states	like	pain	and	hunger	themselves	stand	in	the	sorts	
of	inferential	relations	necessary	for	being	appropriately	called	knowl-
edge.	For	notice	how	strange	it	would	be	to	say	that	he	inferred	from	
his	pain	and	hunger	that	he	should	engage	in	the	extreme	measures.	
The	idea	that	mental	states	like	pain	and	hunger	may	themselves	stand	
in	inferential	relations	may	be	encouraged	by	the	idea	that	reasons	are	
facts.	For	example,	we	say,	“The	fact	that	he’s	overweight	is	a	reason	for	
him	to	diet”,	and	likewise	we	might	translate	the	claim	about	pain	and	
hunger	justifying	extreme	measures	as:	“The	fact	that	he	was	in	pain	
and	hungry	was	a	sufficient	reason	for	his	extreme	measures”.	These	
facts	might	plausibly	be	thought	to	justify	certain	beliefs	and	actions.	
However,	this	doesn’t	mean	that	these	facts	themselves	stand	in	the	
sorts	of	inferential	relations	necessary	for	being	appropriately	called	
knowledge.	 It	would	be	 absurd	 to	 call	 the	 fact	 that	he’s	 overweight	
or	the	fact	that	he	was	in	pain	and	hungry	“knowledge”.	Rather,	what	
seem	to	stand	in	the	necessary	inferential	relations	are	beliefs	that	he’s	
overweight	or	that	he	was	hungry	and	in	pain.	However,	the	avowal	
expressivist	cannot	say	this	without	reverting	to	a	version	of	Bar-On’s	
dual-expression	thesis,	which	we’ve	already	seen	to	be	problematic.
Because	of	this,	if	the	avowal	expressivist	were	to	try	to	avoid	Bar-
On’s	dual-expression	thesis	by	adopting	Blackburn’s	or	Gibbard’s	strat-
egy	for	responding	to	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity,	I	think	
she	would	have	to	commit	to	the	radical	view	that	avowals	can	count	
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their	 truth-aptness,	meaning,	or	semantic	composition	rules.	This	 is	
why	Bar-On	insists	that	hers	is	not	a	view	about	the	meaning	of	avow-
als.	She	wants	to	remain	relatively	neutral	on	the	semantics	of	avowals	
considered	 as	 products,	 while	 defending	 an	 expressive	 contrast	 be-
tween	ordinary	statements	and	avowals,	both	considered	as	acts.
Is	it	coherent	to	couple	an	account	of	the	expressive	function	of	a	
class	of	statements	with	such	semantic	neutrality?	Some	philosophers	
like	 to	 understand	 the	 relationship	 between	 sentences,	 statements,	
and	the	mental	states	expressed	in	a	way	that	makes	this	sort	of	dis-
tinction	appear	unintelligible.	For	instance,	if	you	think	that	of	ethical	
statements	 and	 avowals	 on	 the	 speech-act	 theorists’	model	 of	 asser-
tions,	 you	may	be	one	of	 these	philosophers.	This	 is	because	you’re	
thinking	of	statements	as	speech-acts	that	require	for	sincerity	a	belief	
in	 the	propositional	content	of	 the	sentence	stated.	Given	that	mod-
el,	 it	will	 seem	analytic	or	anyway	very	obvious	 that	 statements	are	
speech-acts	that	token	a	declarative	sentence	to	express	(in	the	sense	
that	sincerity	requires)	a	belief	with	the	same	content	as	this	sentence.	
And,	if	you	think	this,	it	will	seem	incoherent	to	divorce	an	account	of	
the	semantic	features	of	the	sentence	stated	(its	truth-aptness,	mean-
ing,	composition	rules)	from	the	mental	state	expressed	by	this	state-
ment,	in	the	way	that	Bar-On	wants	to	do.	
It’s	natural	to	say	things	like	“To	state	‘The	tree	is	tall’	 is	to	assert	
that	the	tree	is	tall,	which	means	that	one	who	does	this	expresses	the	
belief	that	the	tree	is	tall,	 in	the	sense	that	sincerity	requires	that	he	
have	this	belief”.	However,	I	think	generalizing	from	this	case	is	hasty,	
as	we	can	see	by	considering	three	kinds	of	cases	where	it	is	at	least	
not	 obvious	 that	 statements	 express	 beliefs	with	 the	 content	 of	 the	
sentence	used	to	make	the	statement.	Considering	these	should	make	
Bar-On’s	strategy	of	divorcing	semantic	content	from	expressive	func-
tion	seem	to	be	at	least	a	theoretical	option,	whose	application	in	the	
ethical	case	I	will	then	go	on	to	explore.
First,	when	we	use	sentences	such	as	“I’m	going	to	go	to	the	party	to-
night”	to	express	our	intentions,	it	seems	that	we	use	a	linguistic	prod-
uct	that	is	perfectly	semantically	continuous	with	ordinary	descriptive	
metaethical	literature	is	not	uniform.	In	one	sense,	a	statement	is	an	
act	of	stating	something,	but	in	another	sense,	a	statement	is	the	prod-
uct	of	this	act.	Above	I	suggested	that	we	reserve	the	term	‘statement’	
for	the	former	sense	and	use	the	term	‘sentence’	(or,	more	precisely,	
‘declarative	sentence-token’)	for	the	latter	sense.	
The	important	point	here	is	that,	with	this	distinction	in	hand,	we	
can	make	sense	of	Bar-On’s	idea	that	although	avowals,	considered	as	
products	(sentence	tokens)	are	semantically	continuous	with	uncon-
troversially	descriptive	sentences,	acts	of	avowing	are	expressively	dif-
ferent	from	ordinary	acts	of	stating	something.	She	writes,	“The	prod-
uct	of	an	act	of	avowing,	unlike	a	smile	or	a	wince,	or	even	a	verbal	
cry	such	as	‘Ouch!’,	is	a	semantically	articulate	self-ascription,	an	item	
with	semantic	structure	and	truth-conditions”	(p.	251).	However,	in	her	
view,	that	doesn’t	undermine	the	expressivist	insight,	which	“should	
be	understood,	in	the	first	instance,	as	a	claim	about	the	relevant	acts, 
not	 about	 their	 products”	 (p.	 252).	The	 idea	 is	 that,	 despite	 the	 fact	
that	avowals	considered	as	products	are	like	ordinary	declarative	sen-
tences	 in	 being	 items	with	 semantic	 structure	 and	 truth-conditions,	
and	ordinary	acts	of	stating	something	express	a	belief	with	the	same	
content	as	the	statement	produced	by	the	act,	avowals	are	distinctive	
in	that	they	express	the	mental	state	mentioned	in	the	product	rather	
than	a	belief	with	the	same	content	as	that	product.	So,	for	instance,	
unlike	the	act	of	stating	“The	tree	is	tall”,	which	expresses	the	belief	
that	the	tree	is	tall,	expressivists	say	that	an	avowal	such	as	“I	want	tea”	
expresses	the	desire	for	tea	—	despite	the	fact	that	the	products	“The	
tree	is	tall”	and	“I	want	tea”	are	both	truth-apt	and	otherwise	semanti-
cally	continuous	sentences.	
What	does	it	mean	to	say	that	they	are	semantically	continuous?	In	
the	present	context,	 it	means	that	they	are	both	truth-apt,	they	both	
mean	what	they	mean	in	virtue	of	the	same	sort	of	thing,	and	whatever	
general	compositional	rules	explain	the	semantic	value	of	the	whole	
sentence	in	terms	of	the	semantic	value	of	its	parts	will	apply	similarly	
to	both	sentences.	Importantly,	to	say	that	they	are	semantically	con-
tinuous	is	not	yet	to	give	any	specific	explanation	of	what	constitutes	
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I	believe	that	she	is	back	instead	of	a	less	than	fully	confident	belief	
that	she	is	back.)
It’s	difficult	to	make	precise	sense	of	these	sorts	of	cases,	but	that’s	
not	the	point	of	mentioning	them.	The	point,	rather,	is	to	motivate	the	
idea	that	it’s	at	least	not	obvious	that	every	statement	must	be	thought	
to	express	a	belief	with	the	same	content	as	the	sentence	used	to	make	
the	statement.24	If	we	accept	Bar-On’s	distinction,	this	opens	up	room	
for	 several	 different	 general	 semantic	 explanations	 of	 the	 semantic	
features	of	declarative	sentences,	which	can	then	be	applied	straight-
forwardly	to	avowals	considered	as	products.	As	products,	avowals	are	
declarative	sentences	with	all	of	the	semantic	features	attaching	to	this	
category	of	 linguistic	 item.	Any	semantic	account	of	declarative	sen-
tences	will	have	to	explain	these	features.25	Specifically	relevant	here	
is	that	declarative	sentences	are	truth-apt;	and	this	is	the	case,	Bar-On	
insists,	even	in	cases	where	their	core	use	is	not	to	express	a	self-as-
criptive	belief	but	rather	to	express	some	first-order	mental	state	such	
as	pain	or	a	desire	for	tea.	
Because	of	this,	I	think	we	should	grant	for	the	sake	of	argument	
that	 Bar-On’s	 distinction	 between	 acts	 and	 products	 provides	 for	 a	
successful	internal	response	to	the	objection	from	semantic	continuity	
24.	A	philosopher	enamored	of	that	view	might	respond	by	retreating	to	the	no-
tion	of	assertion	and	suggesting	that	my	cases	are	not	cases	of	assertion,	and	
that	it’s	only	for	cases	of	assertion	that	the	mental	state	expressed	must	be	
a	belief	with	the	same	content	as	 the	sentence	used	to	make	the	assertion.	
That’s	fine.	I	think	the	term	‘assertion’	is	like	the	terms	‘statement’	and	‘sen-
tence’	in	having	no	uniform	usage	in	ordinary	discourse	or	philosophy,	but	
if	one	wants	to	stipulate	that	assertions	are	speech-acts	that	express	beliefs	
with	 the	same	content	as	 the	sentence	used	 to	perform	 the	speech-act,	 I’ll	
give	up	the	word	‘assertion’	in	exchange	for	my	stipulative	definition	of	‘state-
ment’	 (footnote	 1).	 In	 fact,	 I	haven’t	used	 the	 term	 ‘assertion’	 in	 this	paper	
until	five	paragraphs	back,	where	I	began	discussing	why	some	will	find	Bar-
On’s	attempt	to	divorce	the	content	of	avowals	(qua	sentences)	from	the	ac-
count	of	the	mental	expressed	by	avowals	(qua	acts)	unintelligible.
25.	 And	any	general	semantic	and	syntactic	theory	will	have	to	explain	the	trans-
formation	rules	relating	declarative	sentences,	with	their	attendant	semantic	
values,	 to	 other	 grammatical	 forms	 such	 as	 interrogatives	 and	 imperatives.	
However,	the	point	that	is	important	for	the	present	discussion	is	the	seman-
tic	features	of	declarative	sentences.
statements	even	though	we	do	not	use	it	to	express	a	belief	with	the	
content	of	this	product	but	rather	an	intention.	Perhaps	what	we	want	
to	say	 in	 this	case	 is	 that	 the	statement	both	expresses	an	 intention	
and	expresses	or	otherwise	 conveys	 a	belief	with	 the	 same	 content	
of	the	sentence,	but	it	seems	to	me	that	if	one	of	these	is	the	primary	
expressive	point	of	such	statements,	then	it	must	be	the	expression	of	
the	intention.23
Second,	there	are	many	performatives	where	it	is	somewhat	forced	
to	 think	we	 express	 a	 belief	 in	 the	 content	 of	 the	 sentence	used	 to	
make	them.	For	example,	it’s	at	least	not	obviously	wrong	to	think	that	
one	who	states	“I	vote	for	the	green-party	candidate”	is	not	thereby	ex-
pressing	her	belief	that	she	votes	for	the	green-party	candidate.	Maybe	
she	does	believe	this,	but	maybe	she	hasn’t	thought	about	it	enough	
to	form	the	belief,	or	maybe	she	knows	that	the	balloting	rules	prevent	
her	from	voting	for	the	green-party	candidate	(because	she’s	registered	
for	a	different	party)	but	she	is	nonetheless	using	her	statement	as	a	
form	of	protest	against	these	rules.	In	any	of	these	cases,	it	would	be	
strange	to	say	that	she	expresses	her	belief	that	she	votes	for	the	green-
party	candidate	when	she	states	“I	vote	for	the	green-party	candidate”.
Third,	one	seemingly	legitimate	use	of	terms	such	as	 ‘seems’	and	
‘think’	is	to	qualify	a	statement	when	we	are	not	fully	confident.	So,	for	
example,	we	say	things	like	“It	seems	like	it	will	rain”	and	“I	think	he’ll	
answer	my	email”	not	necessarily	to	express	the	self-ascriptive	beliefs,	
respectively,	that	it	seems	like	it	will	rain	and	that	I	think	he’ll	answer	
my	email,	but	rather	to	express	some	lower	credence	in	the	proposi-
tion	that	it	will	rain	and	that	he’ll	answer	my	email.	(Notice	that	this	is	
very	close	to	the	case	of	avowing	a	belief.	One	might	ask	you,	“Is	Mary	
back	from	vacation?”,	to	which	you	might	respond,	“I	believe	she	is”.	It’s	
not	obvious	that	this	response	expresses	the	second-order	belief	that	
23.	 Some	philosophers	are	cognitivists	about	intentions,	which	means	that	they	
think	that	intentions	are	(at	least	in	part)	beliefs.	See	Setyia	(2007a,	2007b).	
So,	 this	 example	may	 not	 persuade	 them.	However,	 even	 they	 should	 ad-
mit	that	their	view	is	controversial,	which	puts	pressure	on	the	obviousness	
of	the	way	of	thinking	of	statements	that	I	am	objecting	too.	Plus,	see	Ross	
(2009)	for	considerations	against	Setiya’s	view	of	intentions.
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seems	open	to	the	avowal	expressivist	to	say	that	mental	sentences	are	
truth-apt	because	some	of	them	correspond	to	the	mental	facts,	even	
while	she	denies	that	their	use	in	avowals	expresses	beliefs	in	these	
facts.	In	contrast,	given	that	one	of	the	advantages	of	ethical	expressiv-
ism	is	supposed	to	be	ontological	parsimony,	the	parallel	position	is	
not	open	to	its	proponents.
I	don’t	 think,	however,	 this	means	 that	Bar-On’s	 response	 to	 the	
objection	 from	semantic	continuity	 is	 completely	unavailable	 to	 the	
ethical	expressivist.	Rather,	what	it	means	is	that	he	cannot	use	it	to	
remain	 completely	neutral	 about	what	 constitutes	 the	 truth-aptness	
of	ethical	 sentences;	more	specifically,	he	cannot	accept	an	explana-
tion	of	this	in	terms	of	possible	correspondence	with	the	ethical	facts.	
However,	that	doesn’t	mean	that	he	cannot	accept	other	nonrealist	ex-
planations	of	the	truth-aptness	of	ethical	sentences	and	remain	other-
wise	neutral	on	the	correct	account	of	the	semantic	features	of	ethical	
sentences.	For	example,	as	far	as	semantic	continuity	goes,	he	could	
clearly	accept	a	minimalist	conception	of	truth-aptness	that	says	that	
basically	all	there	is	to	truth-aptness	is	that	any	sentence	is	truth-apt	
that	can	be	meaningfully	embedded	in	the	truth-predicate.27
This	is	very	similar	to	the	beginning	of	the	dominant	quasi-realist	
response	 to	 the	objection	 from	semantic	 continuity	discussed	 in	§3.	
However,	quasi-realists	go	on	to	extend	minimalism	about	truth	into	
a	minimalist	account	of	belief,	based	on	the	putatively	platitudinous	
connections	 between	 statements	 that	 are	 truth-apt	 and	 statements	
that	express	beliefs.	This	helped	quasi-realists	to	win	the	right	to	say	
many	of	the	things	that	tempt	some	philosophers	to	realism,	but	it	also	
began	the	slide	that	resulted	in	the	collapse	into	realism	or	quietism	
that	we	saw	at	the	end	of	§3.	Because	of	this,	an	ethical	expressivist	
27.	 The	suggestion	here	is	similar	to	Stoljar’s	(1993),	which	is	made	in	the	context	
of	marrying	emotivism	to	a	deflationary	theory	of	truth.	It	is	also	similar	to	
Horwich’s	 (1994)	 brief	 remarks	 about	 the	 consistency	 of	 expressivism	and	
minimalism	about	truth.	However,	unlike	Stoljar,	Horwich	indicates	sympa-
thy	 for	 a	 correlated	minimalism	 about	 belief.	 This	 is	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
slide	that,	as	I	argued	in	§3,	results	in	a	dilemma	for	the	ethical	expressivist	
between	quietism	and	realism.
threatening	avowal	expressivism.	Again,	 I	grant	 this	so	 that	we	may	
ask:	Could	an	ethical	expressivist	give	a	similar	response,	in	order	to	
answer	the	analogous	application	of	the	objection	from	semantic	con-
tinuity	 in	a	way	 that	doesn’t	 run	 into	 the	problems	 raised	 for	quasi-
realism	in	§3?
To	extend	Bar-On’s	strategy,	we	have	to	distinguish	between	ethi-
cal	 sentences	 and	 acts	 of	 making	 ethical	 statements.	 As	 linguistic	
products,	ethical	sentences	have	all	of	the	semantic	features	of	other	
declaratives.	And	this,	the	thought	goes,	is	what	gives	rise	to	the	ob-
servation	that	they	are	semantically	continuous	with	other	uncontro-
versially	descriptive	sentences.	That	is	to	say,	this	is	why	they	appear	
to	be	truth-apt,	meaningful,	and	subject	to	the	same	composition	rules	
as	ordinary	sentences.	However,	with	the	act-product	distinction	and	
the	example	of	avowals	now	on	the	table,	 the	mere	fact	 that	ethical	
sentences	are	semantically	continuous	with	other	sorts	of	sentences	is	
consistent	with	the	original	expressivist	idea	—	couched	now	in	more	
specific	terms	—	that	acts	of	making	an	ethical	statement	serve	to	ex-
press	not	beliefs	but	some	other	kind	of	mental	state	such	as	a	moti-
vational	attitude.26 
There	is,	however,	an	obvious	disanalogy	between	the	ethical	case	
and	the	avowal	case	that	may	seem	to	undermine	this	strategy	straight-
away.	Avoiding	ontological	commitment	to	mental	facts	is	no	part	of	
the	avowal	expressivist’s	position,	whereas	avoiding	ontological	com-
mitment	 to	 ethical	 facts	 is	 part	 of	 the	 ethical	 expressivist’s	 position.	
This	means	 that	while	Bar-On’s	act-product	distinction	may	win	her	
almost	complete	neutrality	among	competing	explanations	of	seman-
tic	features	like	the	truth-aptness	of	mental	sentences	including	avow-
als,	the	ethical	expressivist	cannot	remain	so	neutral.	In	particular,	it	
26.	 In	 Bar-On	 and	 Chrisman	 (2009)	 we	 argue	 that	 applying	 the	 act-product	
distinction	 in	 this	way	 to	 ethical	 claims	 allows	 for	 a	novel	 expressivist	 un-
derstanding	of	the	motivational	character	of	ethical	thought	and	discourse;	
however,	there	we	remain	neutral	on	the	cognitive	or	noncognitive	nature	of	
the	mental	state	expressed	by	ethical	statements.	Here	I	am	suggesting	that	
in	order	to	gain	the	ontological	advantages	of	 traditional	expressivism,	the	
ethical	expressivist	cannot	remain	so	neutral.
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of	ethical	beliefs	as	somehow	erroneous.	And	this	may	seem	not	only	
unorthodox	but	also	seriously	problematic,	since	ethical	expressivism	
is	typically	seen	as	gaining	some	plausibility	from	its	ability	to	avoid	
positing	error	in	ordinary	ethical	discourse.
Second,	in	metaethics,	expressivism	is	often	seen	as	a	view	about	
the	semantic	value	of	ethical	sentences	—	the	view,	roughly,	that	ethi-
cal	sentences	mean	what	they	do	in	virtue	of	the	type	of	attitudes	they	
can	be	used	to	express.28	However,	enforcing	the	act-product	distinc-
tion	means	that	this	form	of	expressivism	is	committed	to	denying	that	
ethical	sentences	mean	what	they	do	in	virtue	of	the	type	of	attitudes	
they	can	be	used	to	express.	This	may	seem	not	only	unorthodox	but	
also	seriously	problematic,	since	even	if	expressivism	is	not	a	semantic	
view,	 it	should	be	consistent	with	at	 least	some	semantics	of	ethical	
sentences.
These	 commitments	 are	 significant	 theoretical	 costs,	 perhaps	 so	
significant	that	no	one	will	be	willing	to	pay	them	in	order	to	get	the	
advantages	 of	 ontological	 and	 psychological	 parsimony	 that	 expres-
sivism	brings	with	 it.	However,	 I	doubt	that	 these	commitments	are	
as	problematic	as	the	commitment	that,	as	we	saw,	an	avowal	expres-
sivist	would	have	to	take	on	in	order	to	make	the	cross-pollinated	ver-
sion	of	that	position	work.	At	least,	that’s	what	I	hope	to	argue	in	the	
remainder	of	this	section.
Regarding	the	first	commitment:	It’s	of	course	true	that	we	ordinar-
ily	speak	of	ethical	beliefs	just	as	much	as	we	speak	of	ethical	truths,	
and	part	of	the	attraction	of	ethical	expressivism	is	the	way	it	can	con-
strue	ethical	discourse	as	non-erroneous.	However,	a	defender	of	the	
sort	of	expressivist	position	that	emerges	from	using	the	act-product	
distinction	can	say	that	the	ordinary	use	of	‘belief’	in	ethical	discourse	
is	loose	usage	or	he	can	say	that	it	is	an	explicable	and	relatively	inno-
cent	mistake.29	He	could	argue	that,	for	ordinary	ascriptions	of	osten-
28.	Blackburn	(1988),	Gibbard	(1990,	2003),	Timmons	(1999),	Ridge	(2006),	and	
Schroeder	(2008)	all	treat	ethical	expressivism	as	an	explicitly	semantic	view.
29.	Dorr	(2002)	argues	that	whatever	we	say	about	the	semantics	of	ethical	sen-
tences,	we	 cannot	 treat	 the	mental	 states	 expressed	by	 these	 sentences	 as	
who	hopes	to	profit	from	extending	Bar-On’s	strategy	for	the	objection	
from	semantic	continuity	should	insist	that	the	act-product	distinction	
shows	this	move	to	minimalism	about	beliefs	is	unnecessary.	It’s	un-
necessary	 because,	 given	 the	 distinction	 between	 ethical	 sentences	
and	the	statements	they	can	be	used	to	make,	one	can	explain	seman-
tic	continuity	at	the	level	of	a	general	semantic	theory	for	declarative	
sentences,	while	maintaining	that	ethical	statements	are	speech-acts	
whose	expressive	function	can	be	different	from	the	expressive	func-
tion	of	ordinary	descriptive	statements.	
Thus,	 the	 sort	 of	 response	 to	 the	 objection	 from	 semantic	 conti-
nuity	that	the	act-product	distinction	would	seem	to	make	room	for	
when	applied	in	the	ethical	case	is	one	where:	
(a)		 ethical	sentences	are	distinguished	from	ethical	statements;
(b)		 the	semantic	features	of	ethical	sentences	are	explained	in	
the	same	way	as	the	semantic	features	of	any	other	declara-
tive	sentence,	and,	in	particular,	truth-aptness	is	explained	
in	a	nonrealist	way;	and	
	(c)		 the	expressive	function	of	ethical	statements	is	said	to	be	
different	 from	 the	 expressive	 function	 of	 ordinary	 belief-
expressing	statements.
To	those	wedded	to	the	parsimony	offered	by	traditional	expressivism,	
this	should	seem	like	a	promising	result	of	our	attempts	to	“cross-pol-
linate”	the	two	sophisticated	expressivist	positions.	However,	I	think	
there	are	 two	potentially	problematic	 commitments	of	 the	 resulting	
position.	
First,	even	if	the	act-product	distinction	can	help	to	explain,	within	
an	expressivist	 framework,	why	we	 treat	ethical	statements	as	 truth-
apt,	it	does	nothing	to	explain	why	ordinary	discourse	often	character-
izes	the	mental	state	expressed	by	ethical	statements	as	beliefs.	Thus,	
this	form	of	ethical	expressivism	is	committed	to	giving	up	on	the	qua-
si-realist	project	of	earning	the	right	to	all	of	the	language	of	ordinary	
discourse,	which	tempts	some	to	realism;	it	will	have	to	see	ascriptions	
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we	should	wonder:	Does	ethical	expressivism	have	 to	be	a	semantic	
view?	What	 would	 be	 lost	 in	 ethical	 expressivism	were	 we	 to	 con-
strue	it	analogously	to	the	neo-expressivist	view	of	avowals,	as	a	view	
about	ethical	statements	qua	acts	and	not	as	a	view	of	the	semantics	
of	ethical	sentences	qua	products?	To	be	sure,	this	would	leave	a	ques-
tion	unanswered	 that	 ethical	 expressivists	 have	often	wanted	 to	 an-
swer.	However,	 it	doesn’t,	as	 far	as	 I	can	 tell,	abandon	the	principal	
advantages	typically	claimed	for	ethical	expressivism:	ontological	and	
psychological	parsimony.	For	 the	claim	that	ethical	statements	don’t	
express	ethical	beliefs	(i. e.,	beliefs	in	ethical	facts)	surely	goes	a	long	
way	 towards	underwriting	 the	 claim	 that	ethical	discourse	does	not	
commit	its	participants	to	the	existence	of	ethical	facts.	And	while	the	
issue	of	ontological	parsimony	may	have	seemed	to	be	a	semantic	is-
sue,	depending	on	one’s	views	about	how	to	do	semantics,	the	issue	
of	psychological	parsimony	is	not	by	anyone’s	lights	a	semantic	issue.	
The	 expressivist’s	 explanation	 of	 the	 apparently	 tight	 link	 between	
ethical	 judgments	and	motivations	 is	an	explanation	 turning	on	 the	
psychological	nature	of	ethical	 judgments;	and,	as	such,	 it	need	not	
force	any	particular	semantic	account	of	the	sentences,	which	are	used	
to	express	these	judgments.
But	the	deeper	worry	here	may	be	that	the	sort	of	ethical	expres-
sivism	 that	 emerges	 from	co-opting	Bar-On’s	 avowal	 expressivist	 re-
sponse	to	the	objection	from	semantic	continuity	cannot	give	any	ac-
count	of	the	semantics	of	ethical	sentences	whatsoever.	After	all,	if	it	
doesn’t	 explain	 their	meaning	 in	 terms	of	 the	 attitudes	 they	 can	be	
used	to	express,	then	how	can	it	explain	them?	Obviously,	 it	cannot	
appeal	to	the	facts	that	they	represent.
I	suspect	this	worry	rests	on	a	mistake.	In	the	metaethics	literature,	
it	seems	to	be	assumed	fairly	widely	that	explaining	the	semantic	con-
tent	of	ethical	sentences	requires	appeal	either	 to	 the	 facts	 they	rep-
resent	 or	 to	 the	mental	 states	 their	 typical	 utterance	 conventionally	
expresses.	And,	since	the	expressivist	wants	to	avoid	commitment	to	
ethical	 facts,	 one	 concludes	 that	 he	must	 explain	 the	 semantic	 con-
tent	of	ethical	sentences	in	terms	of	the	mental	states	conventionally	
sibly	ethical	beliefs,	‘believes’	could	be	replaced	with	‘thinks’	without	
loss;	and	his	position	is	that	these	thoughts	are	not,	strictly	speaking,	
beliefs	 but	 some	 sort	 of	motivational	 attitude.	 For	 example,	 if	 I	 say,	
“Mike	believes	that	murder	is	wrong”,	this	sort	of	expressivist	will	claim	
that	nothing	is	lost	by	translating	this	into	“Mike	thinks	that	murder	is	
wrong”	and	understanding	this	thought	as	what	would	be	expressed	
were	Mike	to	say	“Murder	is	wrong”.	To	be	sure,	this	involves	positing	a	
sort	of	error	to	ordinary	ethical	discourse,	but	it	doesn’t	involve	think-
ing	that	the	whole	discourse	rests	on	false	presuppositions	or	thinking	
that	many	ethical	sentences	we	think	are	true	are	actually	false.30 
So	a	cross-pollinated	version	of	ethical	expressivism	is	committed	
to	 positing	 some	 error	 to	 ordinary	 ethical	 discourse	 insofar	 as	 that	
involves	 the	ascription	of	ostensibly	ethical	beliefs.	And	 this	will	 in	
turn	 require	 an	unorthodox	understanding	of	 propositional-attitude	
ascriptions.	However,	despite	its	unorthodox	nature,	I	don’t	think	this	
commitment	is	as	untenable	as	the	commitment	required	to	make	the	
cross-pollinated	version	of	avowal	expressivism	work.	That	position,	
recall,	required	us	to	think	any	avowable	mental	state	(e. g.,	pain,	hun-
ger,	love,	etc.)	is	a	potential	item	of	knowledge.
Regarding	the	second	commitment:	Although	many	recent	expres-
sivists	have	hoped	to	provide	novel	accounts	of	the	semantic	value	of	
ethical	sentences,	 I	 think	 that,	 in	 light	of	 the	act-product	distinction,	
motivational	 states	 instead	 of	 beliefs	without	 undermining	 the	 obvious	 in-
ferential	relations	that	can	stand	between	ethical	judgments	and	other	sorts	
of	 judgments.	This	 is	a	nice	argument,	but	 I	don’t	 think	 it	 shows	 that	ethi-
cal	claims	must	express	beliefs;	rather	what	it	shows	is	that	whatever	ethical	
claims	express	must	be	capable	of	standing	in	rational	relations	with	beliefs.	
Intentions,	 plans,	 certain	 sorts	 of	 commitments,	 etc.,	 are	 all	 plausible	 non-
belief	candidates	for	this	job.
30.	Admittedly,	 this	move	will	 require	a	more	complicated	account	of	proposi-
tional-attitude	ascriptions	than	is	normal.	For	example,	this	sort	of	expressiv-
ist	will	have	to	reject	standard	accounts	of	sentences	such	as	“She	said	that	
murder	is	wrong,	and	I	believe	what	she	said”	as	perfectly	analogous	to	“She	
said	 that	grass	 is	green,	and	 I	believe	what	 she	said”.	The	expressivist	will	
have	to	analyze	the	former	in	terms	of	having	the	same	attitude	towards	mur-
der	rather	than	in	terms	of	standing	in	the	belief	relation	to	the	proposition	
expressed	by	the	sentence,	as	is	natural	in	the	latter	case.	Thanks	to	an	anony-
mous	referee	for	pressing	me	to	be	clear	about	this	implication	of	the	view.
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Personally,	 I	 think	something	like	the	first	option	is	most	promis-
ing.34	However,	 the	point	here	 is	not	 to	articulate	and	defend	an	ac-
count	of	the	semantics	of	ethical	sentences	but	simply	to	point	out	that,	
even	if	following	Bar-On	in	making	the	act-product	distinction	means	
that	 the	expressivist’s	core	thesis	doesn’t	provide	for	answers	to	cer-
tain	semantic	questions	that	ethical	expressivists	have	typically	sought	
to	answer,	this	does	not	mean	that	they	remain	unanswerable	for	him.	
To	be	sure,	he’ll	want	to	answer	them	in	a	way	that	doesn’t	presuppose	
the	existence	of	ethical	 facts;	but	we’ve	 just	 seen	 that	 there	are	sev-
eral	options	for	doing	so.	As	long	as	that	is	true,	then	I	think	we	have	
to	recognize	 that	 the	second	commitment	mentioned	above	doesn’t	
undermine	the	sort	of	ethical	expressivism	that	follows	Bar-On	in	dis-
tinguishing	between	statements	qua	acts	and	statements	qua	products.	
This	is	what	we	should	expect.	The	expressivist’s	core	thesis	is	that	
typical	 acts	 of	making	 an	 ethical	 statement	 express	motivational	 at-
titudes	rather	than	beliefs.	If	that	core	thesis	is	all	we	want	to	defend,	
there	 is	no	reason	the	ethical	expressivist	has	 to	commit	 to	any	par-
ticular	 semantics	of	 ethical	 sentences.35	 It	may	 seem	 that	going	 this	
34.	 I’ve	defended	this	 in	Chrisman	(2008b).	The	point	here	 is	not	what	 the	ex-
pressivist	should	say	about	the	semantics	of	ethical	sentences	but	that	there	
are	still	several	options	available	even	after	he	follows	Bar-On	in	making	the	
act-product	 distinction	 and	 abandoning	 the	 typical	 expressivist	 aim	 of	 ex-
plaining	the	semantic	value	of	ethical	sentences	in	terms	of	the	mental	states	
that	one	expresses	stating	them.	Strictly	speaking,	I	think	each	of	the	options	
discussed	in	the	main	text	above	are	then	open	to	him.	Of	course,	depending	
on	one’s	views	in	the	philosophy	of	language,	one	or	another	of	these	options	
may	appear	better	than	the	others.	But	I	take	one	of	the	major	benefits	of	the	
act-product	distinction	to	be	the	sort	of	relative	neutrality	about	issues	in	the	
philosophy	of	language	it	allows	expressivists	to	achieve,	all	the	while	hang-
ing	onto	their	core	thesis	and	the	advantages	it	is	supposed	to	bring.
35.	 One	might	insist	that,	even	if	it	is	correct	that	acts	of	making	an	ethical	state-
ment	are	not	acts	of	expressing	a	belief,	as	long	as	we	grant	that	ethical	sen-
tences	are	truth-evaluable,	it	should	in	principle	be	possible	to	have	a	belief	
with	their	content.	But	if	this	is	true,	then	any	expressivist	who	pursues	an	
answer	 proceeding	 from	 the	 act-product	 distinction	 to	 the	 objection	 from	
semantic	continuity	faces	a	dilemma:	either	he	must	follow	the	quasi-realist	
in	deflating	the	ontological	import	of	the	notion	of	belief	or	he	must	admit	
the	possibility	of	ethical	beliefs	which	aim	to	correctly	represent	the	world.	
While	I	think	this	point	is	correct,	I	don’t	think	it	would	be	damaging	for	the	
expressed	by	their	typical	utterance.	But	this	line	of	thought	rests	on	
a	false	dichotomy.	To	be	sure,	because	they	have	failed	to	recognize	
the	act-product	distinction	and	they	have	wanted	to	avoid	error-theory,	
most	ethical	expressivists	have	sought	to	explain	the	semantic	content	
of	ethical	sentences	in	terms	of	the	mental	states	they	are	convention-
ally	used	to	express.	However,	there	are	other	non-representationalist	
approaches	 to	 semantic	 explanation	 besides	 the	 roughly	 Lockean/
Gricean	ideationalist	approach	typically	pursued	by	expressivists.	
For	instance,	we	might	also	seek	to	explain	the	semantic	content	of	
ethical	sentences	in	terms	of	their	socially	embodied	inferential	role:	
an	ethical	sentence	is	a	piece	that	one	can	play	in	the	language	game	
of	giving	and	asking	for	reasons	for	other	statements	and	actions.31	Or	
perhaps	we	might	hold	that	 there	 is	nothing	 illuminating	to	be	said	
about	 the	 semantics	 of	 ethical	 sentences	 beyond	 regimenting	 com-
monalities	 and	 relations	 in	 content	 among	 subsentential	 parts	 and	
across	 languages:	 an	 ethical	 sentence	 expresses	 a	 particular	 propo-
sition,	which	 is	understood	not	 in	 representationalist	 terms	but	sim-
ply	as	what	 it	has	 in	 common	with	 synonymous	 sentences	 in	other	
languages.32	Or,	finally,	perhaps	we	might	hold	that	ethical	sentences	
do	get	their	semantic	value	in	virtue	of	their	representational	purport 
but	that	they	are	not	used	to	express	beliefs	in	the	facts	purportedly	
represented.33 
31.	 This	 is	 the	 sort	 of	 general	 semantic	 project	 pursued	 by	 Sellars	 (1968),	
Rosenberg	(1974),	and	Brandom	(1994).	There	are	other	 inferential-	or	con-
ceptual-role	approaches	to	semantics	that	are	less	congenial	to	an	anti-realist	
construal	of	ethical	discourse	—	e. g.,	Peacocke	(1992)	—	but	the	existence	of	
some	that	are	is	enough	to	support	the	point	I	am	making	in	the	text	above.
32.	 This	 is	 one	way	 to	 interpret	 the	 ontological	 commitments	 involved	 in	 the	
semantic	project	pursued	by	Davidson	(1967,	1975),	as	well	as	that	pursued	
by	Schiffer	(2003).	
33.	 This	 is	 akin	 to	 the	version	of	hermeneutic	moral	fictionalism	defended	by	
Kalderon	(2005).	This	has	seemed	to	some	to	be	a	unstable	view.	Perhaps	it	
is;	my	point	is	not	to	endorse	it	here	but	only	to	point	out	that,	without	further	
argument	against	 it,	 it	does	 represent	a	 third	option	 for	 the	ethical	expres-
sivist	who	follows	Bar-on	in	making	the	act-product	distinction,	in	order	to	
overcome	the	objection	from	semantic	continuity.	See	Chrisman	(2008a)	for	
more	discussion	of	Kalderon’s	view.
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which	results	from	co-opting	Bar-On’s	avowal	expressivist’s	answer	to	
the	objection	from	semantic	continuity.	Because	of	the	disanalogy	in	
the	ontological	commitments	of	ethical	expressivism	and	avowal	ex-
pressivism,	this	move	may	initially	seem	unavailable.	However,	what	
we’ve	just	seen	is	that	it	is	available	as	long	as	we	allow	the	expressivist	
two	controversial	commitments:	(i)	an	unorthodox	account	of	belief-
ascriptions	in	ethical	discourse,	and	(ii)	an	unorthodox	measure	of	se-
mantic	neutrality.	As	far	as	I	can	tell,	these	commitments	are	consistent	
with	claiming	the	principal	advantages	typically	claimed	by	ethical	ex-
pressivists	—	viz.,	 ontological	 and	psychological	 parsimony,	which	 is	
what	should	make	this	seem	like	a	particularly	attractive	move	from	
the	point	of	view	of	ethical	expressivism.	Even	so,	giving	up	on	 the	
part	of	the	quasi-realist	project	which	seeks	to	earn	the	right	to	speak	
of	ethical	beliefs,	and	giving	up	on	explaining	the	meaning	of	sentences	
in	terms	of	what	they	can	be	used	to	express,	are	significant	costs.	Do	
they	involve	an	unacceptable	affront	to	ordinary	discourse	or	merely	a	
theoretical	cost	that	may	be	outweighed	by	the	theoretical	advantages	
of	expressivism?	I	remain	unsure,	which	is	why	I	said	at	the	outset	that	
§4–5	would	be	somewhat	more	speculative	attempts	to	draw	out	the	
theoretical	commitments	needed	to	make	a	cross-pollinated	version	of	
each	expressivist	position	work	rather	than	to	provide	a	final	verdict.
VI. Conclusion
The	original	expressivist	idea	has,	I	think,	palpable	attraction	for	those	
with	a	certain	conservative	sensibility	regarding	philosophical	expla-
nations.	 It	 is	 interesting	how	this	manifests	 itself	differently	 for	ethi-
cal	expressivists	and	avowal	expressivists.	Ethical	expressivists	seek	to	
avoid	commitment	to	a	particular	kind	of	fact	and	a	particular	kind	of	
psychological	story.	Avowal	expressivists	seek	to	avoid	commitment	
to	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 cognitive	 faculty	 or	method	 and	 a	 particular	
kind	of	epistemological	story.	But	both	positions	face	the	objections	
from	semantic	continuity	and	epistemic	continuity.	In	this	essay,	I	have	
sought	to	draw	out	the	parallels	between	the	two	positions	and	their	
dialectical	situation	vis-à-vis	the	two	objections.	This	is,	first,	simply	
route	makes	the	core	expressivist	thesis	otiose:	don’t	we	already	get	
ontological	parsimony	from	one	of	the	non-representationalist	seman-
tics	for	ethical	sentences?	I	don’t	think	so.	Even	if	a	sentence	S	doesn’t	
have	its	semantic	value	in	virtue	of	representing	the	fact	that	S,	 that	
doesn’t	yet	imply	that	one	who	states	that	S is	not	expressing	a	belief	
in	that	fact.	The	core	thesis	of	ethical	expressivism	fills	in	this	lacuna	
in	pursuit	of	an	ontologically	parsimonious	way	to	interpret	ordinary	
ethical	discourse.	Moreover,	 the	core	 thesis	 is	also	central	 to	 the	ex-
pressivist’s	claim	to	a	psychologically	parsimonious	way	of	explaining	
the	connection	between	ethical	claims	and	motivations.
So,	 a	 cross-pollinated	 version	 of	 ethical	 expressivism	 is	 commit-
ted	to	denying	that	ethical	sentences	mean	what	they	do	in	virtue	of	
the	mental	states	 they	can	be	used	 to	express.	However,	despite	 it’s	
unorthodox	nature,	I	don’t	think	this	commitment	is	as	untenable	as	
the	commitment	that,	as	we	saw,	was	required	to	make	the	cross-pol-
linated	version	of	avowal	expressivism	work.	In	fact,	this	commitment	
makes	ethical	expressivism	a	more	conservative	position	in	virtue	of	
not	attempting	to	be	the	foundation	of	a	semantic	account	of	ethical	
sentences.
In	 §3,	 I	 argued	 that,	 if	we	 follow	 the	quasi-realist	 in	 taking	up	 a	
minimalist	stance	towards	talk	of	truth,	belief,	and	all	related	notions,	
ethical	expressivism	seems	to	be	undermined	by	a	dilemma	between	
quietism	 and	 realism.	 In	 this	 section,	 I’ve	 explored	 an	 alternative	
expressivist	to	embrace	the	second	horn	of	the	dilemma.	For,	although	the	
expressivist’s	position	is	that	ethical	statements	are	ordinarily	used	to	express	
motivational	attitudes,	that	shouldn’t	make	it	 impossible	to	have	and	to	ex-
press	beliefs	with	the	content	of	the	statements	any	more	than	the	fact	that	
the	statement	“I’m	going	to	go	to	the	party”	is	ordinarily	used	primarily	to	ex-
press	an	intention	makes	it	impossible	to	have	and	express	a	belief	with	this	
content.	The	important	claim	is	that	this	is	not	the	ordinary	way	these	state-
ments	are	used.	Perhaps	committed	moral	realists	genuinely	do	believe	that	
murder	is	wrong,	in	the	sense	that	they	have	a	mental	state	with	this	content	
that	aims	to	correctly	represent	the	facts.	But	the	mere	possibility	of	having	
and	expressing	such	a	belief	does	not	cause	a	problem	for	the	expressivist,	
for	he	can	hold	that	this	belief	is	false	and	that	ordinary	ethical	statements	do	
not	express	beliefs	in	this	way.	That	is	just	to	hold	that	moral	realism	is	false,	
which,	after	all,	is	one	of	the	primary	attractions	of	the	expressivist’s	position.
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products	while	maintaining	an	expressive	discontinuity	at	the	level	of	
linguistic	acts.	In	this	case,	I	found	the	route	to	escaping	the	objection	
from	semantic	continuity	to	require	an	unorthodox	view	of	the	theo-
retical	aspirations	of	ethical	expressivism.	But	the	theoretical	commit-
ments	required	to	make	this	view	work	are,	in	my	view,	less	tenuous	
than	those	required	to	make	the	correlated	avowal	expressivist	view	
work.
The	 first	 half	 of	 this	 paper	 argued	 for	 two	 negative	 conclusions	
about	 the	 prospects	 of	 recent	 sophisticated	 versions	 of	 avowal	 and	
ethical	expressivism.	The	second	half	of	this	paper	has	been	an	experi-
ment	in	theoretical	cross-pollination	in	pursuit	of	the	explanatory	par-
simony	those	positions	were	originally	designed	to	achieve.	I	suspect	
that	many	who	are	not	sympathetic	to	the	general	expressivist	strategy	
will	 see	 the	cross-pollination	explored	here	as,	 in	 the	end,	perverse	
inbreeding	rather	than	good	engineering.	However,	I	also	suspect	that	
many	harbor	admiration	for	the	explanatory	parsimony	achieved	by	
both	 forms	of	expressivism	in	 their	pure	 forms.	They	pick	up	nicely	
on	the	Wittgensteinian	resistance	to	positing	special	kinds	of	facts	or	
faculties	in	order	to	explain	the	continuities	between	the	ways	we	use	
different	kinds	of	language.	As	Wittgenstein	was	so	good	at	showing,	
these	continuities	don’t	force	us	to	see	all	declarative	language	as	hav-
ing	the	same	expressive	function.	In	the	end,	though,	I	can	see	a	way	
that	 the	ethical	expressivist	might	benefit	 from	the	theoretical	cross-
pollination;	I	think	the	avowal	expressivist	does	not.36
36.	For	helpful	feedback	on	various	parts	of	this	material,	I’d	like	to	thank	Dorit	
Bar-On,	J.	Adam	Carter,	Graham	Hubbs,	Conor	McHugh,	Ram	Neta,	Michael	
Ridge,	 Eduardo	 Zamuner,	 anonymous	 referees,	 and	 the	 participants	 in	
the	May	2005	Symposium	on	 the	work	of	Dorit	Bar-On	at	 the	Universität	
Tübingen	(especially	Manfred	Frank	and	Frank	Hofmann).
because	 I	 think	 there	have	not	been	enough	 comparisons	of	 the	 re-
spective	 theoretical	 benefits	 and	 burdens	 of	 the	 two	 positions.	 But,	
second,	 I	 think	 contemporary	 sophistications	 of	 the	 original	 expres-
sivist	idea	in	each	area	have	traced	out	rather	different	paths	in	pursuit	
of	responses	to	the	two	objections;	and,	in	each	case,	the	most	promi-
nent	response	to	at	least	one	of	the	objections	concedes	too	much	to	
the	expressivists’	traditional	opponents.	
First,	 the	dominant	 contemporary	 avowal	 expressivist’s	 response	
to	the	objection	from	epistemic	continuity	has	come	in	the	form	of	the	
neo-expressivist	endorsement	of	the	dual-expression	thesis,	and	I	ar-
gued	that	this	collapses	the	distinction	between	avowal	expressivism	
and	 introspectionism	broadly	 construed.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 explored	
the	possibility	of	co-opting	the	sort	of	response	to	the	objection	pur-
sued	by	Gibbard’s	ethical	expressivism.	This	was,	in	effect,	to	adopt	a	
general	expressivist	analysis	of	knowledge	statements,	which	allowed	
for	 an	 explanation	 of	 our	 attributions	 of	 knowledge	 that	makes	 no	
commitment	on	 the	nature	of	 the	mental	 states	 expressed	by	 those	
to	whom	knowledge	is	attributed.	I	 found	this	route	to	escaping	the	
dilemma	of	introspectionism	and	the	objection	from	epistemic	conti-
nuity	to	require	a	radical	view	of	what	mental	states	can	be	properly	
called	knowledge	(much	more	radical	than	that	required	by	the	ethi-
cal	expressivist	who	favors	this	defensive	strategy).	And	so	I	think	it	
doesn’t	ultimately	help	the	avowal	expressivist	to	avoid	the	criticisms	
leveled	in	§2.
Second,	the	dominant	contemporary	ethical	expressivist’s	response	
to	the	objection	from	semantic	continuity	has	come	in	the	expressivist	
cum	general	minimalist	program	called	quasi-realism,	which	I	suggest-
ed	collapses	the	distinction	between	ethical	expressivism	and	realism	
either	by	making	expressivism	into	a	form	of	realism	or	by	completely	
undermining	the	realism	debate.	For	this	reason,	I	explored	the	possi-
bility	of	co-opting	the	sort	of	response	to	the	objection	pursued	by	Bar-
On’s	avowal	expressivism.	This	was,	in	effect,	to	distinguish	between	
the	act	of	making	a	 statement	and	 the	product	of	 this	act,	which	al-
lows	for	an	explanation	of	semantic	continuity	at	the	level	of	linguistic	
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